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SPECIAL STUDENT PROJECT

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE SURFACE
MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION
ACT OF 1977*
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19771

(SMCRA) is one of the most significant enactments ever to affect
the coal mining industry. In pervasive fashion, it is intended to
control virtually every environmental aspect of surface mining as
well as all surface effects of underground coal mining. The responsibility for establishing a regulatory program to refine and
implement the Act is vested in the United States Department of
the Interior. However, as individual regulatory plans are submitted by the states and approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
the Act provides for an assumption by the states of primary regulatory authority over mining activities conducted within their
borders.
As of mid-1980, no state except Texas had assumed primary
regulatory authority. Proposed amendments to the SMCRA,
changes and uncertainties in the model regulatory program as
promulgated by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
* This project, a variation from the types of articles which have appeared in
prior National Coal Issues of the West Virginia Law Review, is intended as a
seminal effort, leading to similar undertakings in the future to cover developments
in black lung compensation, coal mine health and safety, federal coal leasing, and
other topics of particular impact upon the development of coal as an energy
source. The assistance of the contributing authors in developing the concept and
structuring the presentation is gratefully acknowledged. In addition, a special
expression of appreciation is extended to Ms. Linda Hodge, of the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Washington, D.C., who graciously
supplied the West Virginia Law Review with helpful information and slip
opinions of the cases noted herein.
Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I
1977)). For an extensive analysis of the Act and early developments thereunder,
see A Symposium on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
81 W. VA. L. Rav. 553 (1979) (comprises Issue No. 4 - the National Coal Issue of that volume).
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Enforcement (OSM), and challenges to OSM's authority to regulate certain aspects of coal mining have all contributed to the delay in the states' assumption of primary regulatory authority.
This Project is intended to note the significant changes and
challenges to the SMCRA and to the regulations promulgated
thereunder over the period beginning with the issuance of the
permanent regulatory program until the present time.
L

LEGISLATION

One amendment to the SMCRA has been tendered since the
Act's inception. This amendment, S. 1403,2 passed by the Senate
'S. 1403 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), as amended, was passed as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Amendments
of 1979", and that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 (91 Stat. 445) is hereby amended as follows:
Sec. 2. Sections 502(d), 503(a), and 504(a) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act") are amended as follows:
(a) in section 502(d) of the Act in the last sentence, strike the
words "forty-two months" and substitute the words "fifty-four months";
(b) in section 503(a) of the Act, strike the words "eighteenthmonth" and substitute the words "thirtieth-month";
(c) in section 504(a) of the Act, strike the words "thirty-four
months" and substitute the words "forty-six months";
(d) in section 504(a)(1) of the Act, strike the words "eighteenthmonth" and substitute the words "thirtieth month";
Sec. 3. Sections 503(a)(7) and 701(25) of the Act are amended as
follows:
(a) in section 503(a)(7) of the Act, strike the phrase "regulations
issued by the Secretary pursuant to";
(b) in section 701(25) of the Act, strike the phrase "and regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant to this Act".
Sec. 4. Section 523(a) of the Act is amended by striking the words
"and implement" in the first sentence thereof, and by adding at the end
of the subsection a new sentence as follows: "Subject to the provision of
section 523(c), implementation of a Federal lands program shall occur
and coincide with the implementation of a State program pursuant to
section 503 or a Federal program pursuant to section 504, as
appropriate."
Sec. 5. Section 502 of the Act is amended by adding a new subsection "(g)" as follows:
"(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, each
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on September 11, 1979, addresses the issue of state primacy. The
bill, as amended, was designed to have three effects: 1) to extend
the time period for the submission of state regulatory programs;
2) to delay until mid-1980 or early 1981 the implementation of a
federal lands program; and 3) to eliminate the "mirror image" requirements that states' regulatory programs be virtually identical
to that of OSM. Thereby, state programs could be tailored to
each state's individual needs and unique features while still complying with the SMCRA. s
The proposed time period extensions apply to sections 502(d)
(expanded to fifty-four months);4 503(a) (expanded to thirty
months); 5 504(a) (expanded to forty-six months);' and 504(a)(1)
(expanded to thirty months).7 The overall effect is to give a one
year extension on the time limits for state submission of regulatory programs in order to comply with the SMCRA.8
Section four of S. 1403 deals with the implementation of a
federal lands program under SMCRA section 523(a).9 The effect
of the proposed section is to amend section 523 so as to delay the
implementation of a federal lands program in a state until a state
program (or a federal program in lieu of a state program) is imState shall, to the greatest extent possible, have principal responsibility
for the inspection of mines during the period of time prior to the submittal of State plans for approval. Such responsibility shall remain with
each State until such time as the Secretary disapproves the State plan.
The Secretary shall furnish personnel assistance to the States in carrying out this responsibility upon request of the State regulatory agency."
3 125 CONG. REc. S. 12,352 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of
Sen.
Hatfield). The legislative history of the Senate version of S.1403 may be found at
S. REr. No. 96-271, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The debate on the Senate floor
may be found at 125 CoNG. Rc. S.12,352-89 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
4 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(d) (West Supp. 1979) (permit application
after implementation of permanent program - forty-two months after Aug. 3, 1977).
5 Id. § 1253(a) (submission of state program eighteen months after Aug. 3,
1977).
o Id. § 1254(a) (federal program implementation for non-complying state thirty-four months after Aug. 3, 1977).
7 Id. § 1254(a)(1) (failure to submit state program eighteen months after
Aug. 3, 1977).

8 A seven month extension was granted for submission of state programs in
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, C.A. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C.
Aug. 21, 1979) (slip op.).

9 30 U.S.C.A. § 1273(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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plemented, instead of the present time limit of one year after August 3, 1977.
The heart of the Senate amendments lies in sections three
and five of S. 1403. These two sections address the state primacy
issue. Section three amends sections 503(a)(7) 10 and 701(25)," of
the SMCRA by deleting feferences to the regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Interior. Section five of S. 1403 would add a
new subsection (g) to section 502 to allow the states to exercise
primary authority over mine site inspections under the initial
12
program.
The attempt to free the states from de facto duplication of
the regulations of OSM has drawn the most debate. The arguments range from the supporters' views that the "Rockefeller
Amendments" (named lafter West Virginia governor John D.
Rockefeller IV, chairman of the President's Commission on Coal)
will further the purposes of the SMCRA, which are primarily concerned with state primacy, to those of the opponents of the bill,
who maintain that the amendments will defeat the national scope
of the SMCRA and subject the regulatory process to judicial authorship.13 One point is clear. The Rockefeller Amendments were
proposed because of increasing state dissatisfaction with the regulations proposed by and the enforcement measures taken by
OSM, especially in coal producing states.
The status of S. 1403 is presently unclear. It has passed the
Senate but it remains in the House Committee under the sponsorship of Congressman Morris Udall, where it is expected to be
indefinitely tabled.1 4 However, in light of OSM's regulatory activ-

20 Id. § 1253(a)(7) (submission of state programs): "rules and regulations consistent with regulationsissued by the Secretary pursuant to this chapter." (emphasis added). The portion of the subsection emphasized would be deleted.
11Id. § 1291(25) (definition of a state program). The same amendment is proposed here as for section 523(a)(7), supra note 10.
"1 Cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Andrus, C.A. No. 79-2142 (S.D. W. Va. July 17,
1979) (slip op.).
13 125 CONG. Rac. S. 12,350-51 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (remarks of Sen.
Jackson). Compare SMCRA § 101(f), with section 101(g), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(f),
(g) (West. Supp. 1979).
14

See Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-

tion Act of 1977 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. Rlv. 553 (1979).
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ity and the litigation now in progress, the primacy fight is far
from over.
William Sunday Winfrey II
II.
SUBCHAPTER A -

Part 700 -

THE REGULATION PROGRAM

GENERAL

General

Several modifications have been proposed to the two acre exemption provision of section 700.11(b) of the permanent regulations. 15 First, OSM proposes to delete that portion of the section
which provides that operations conducted by a person who affects
or intends to affect more than two acres at physically unrelated
sites within one year may not be exempted from operation of the
permanent regulations by use of the two acre exemption.1 Second, OSM proposes that section 700.11(b) be amended to provide
that the two acre exemption provision does not apply to coal
processing and preparation facilities. 17 Finally, OSM proposes to
add that all land disturbed by coal extraction and incident to the
extraction of coal (including haul roads) and all bodies of water
within the boundaries of the disturbed land will be included in
the two acre calculation. 18
A final rule has been issued which provides that the incorporation by reference of the definition of "Anthracite" in section
700.5 will expire on July 1, 1980, rather than on February 7,
1980.19
Part 701

-

Permanent Regulatory Program

An amendment has been made by final rule to section
701.1(b)(3) and to various provisions of Parts 76120 and 769" of
the permanent regulations to clarify that the postponement of operator compliance with the performance standards of Subchapter

1 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b) (1979).
"645 Fed. Reg. 8244 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b)).
17Id.
Is Id.

1"45 Fed. Reg. 8240 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 700.5).
:0 30 C.F.R. §§ 761.1 to 761.12 (1979).
1 30 C.F.R. §§ 769.1 to 769.18 (1979).
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K22 for operations on federal lands 23 does not postpone the pro-

gram which designates certain federal lands as unsuitable for surface mining.24 On January 3, 1980, the District Court for the
Western District of Virginia in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Andrus, 25 held that the unsuitable
lands program of section 522 of the SMCRA 26 is unconstitutional.
OSM has proposed an industry-supported language change in
section 701.11(e)(1)(i) and (ii) of the permanent regulations which
currently provides that if certain specified findings are made, an
existing structure may be exempted from meeting the design requirements of Subchapter K. This proposed language change,
changing the second "may" in subsections (i) and (ii) to "shall," 27
would make it clear that if the specified findings are made, the
grant of an exemption by the regulatory authority would be
mandatory, not discretionary.28
Part 705
ees

-

Restrictions on FinancialInterests of State Employ-

OSM has proposed to amend the definition of "Employee" in
section 705.5 by eliminating the exception created there for members of advisory boards or commissions established in accordance
with State law or regulations to represent multiple interests.29
This proposed change would subject members of boards or commissions who represent multiple interests to the financial interest
restrictions of Part 705.30

30 C.F.R. §§ 810.1 to 828.12 (1979).

See the discussion of Part 741, infra. at 1290.
- 30 C.F.R. § 701.1(b)(3) (1979); id. § 761.1; id. § 761.4(a)(1) and (a)(2); id.
§ 761.12(a), (b)(2), (c), (e), (f)(1) and (f)(2); id. § 769.7(b), (c)and (d); id.

§ 769.14(i); id. § 769.17(d).
No. 78-0224-B at 25 (W. D. Va. Jan. 3, 1980) (slip op.) [hereinafter cited as
Virginia Surface Mining].
2630 U.S.C.A. § 1272 (West Supp. 1979).
- 45 Fed. Reg. 8244 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 701.11 (e)(1)(i) and

(ii)).
" 45 Fed. Reg. 8242 (1979).
2930 C.F.I. § 705.5 (1979).
- 30 C.F.R. § 705.1 to 705.21 (1979).
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Part 706 ployees

Restrictions on FinancialInterests of Federal Em-

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 707 - Exemption for Coal Extraction Incident to Government Financed Highway or Other Construction
There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER

B-

INITIAL PROGRAM: REGULATIONS

Part 710 - Initial Regulatory Program
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 715 -

General Performance

OSM has suspended, pending further modification by
rulemaking,31 certain provisions of section 715.17 of the initial
regulations which exempt an operator from meeting total suspended solids effluent limits for discharges from a disturbed area
resulting from a 10-year, 24-hour precipitation event.3 2 The OSM
comments on what requirements will
continue to be enforced af33
ter the suspension should be noted.
Several changes have been made to section 715.A7(b)(1)(v) of
the initial regulations which establishes requirements for a
permitee's report concerning the permitee's monitoring of surface-water discharges from a disturbed area. First, the report
must now be submitted to the regulatory authority within sixty
days after the end of each sixty day sample collection period,
rather than within sixty days after the date of the sample collection.34 Second, a permitee may now satisfy the reporting requirement by compliance with a substantially equivalent time period
reporting requirement under the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) of the Clean Water Act.35 Finally,

31

OSM has published notice of intent to commence rulemaking on the sus-

pended provisions at 44 Fed. Reg. 77,456 (1979).
- 30 C.F.R. § 717.15(a)(1) (1979); id. § 717.15(e)(2); id. § 717.15(e)(3); id.
§ 717.15(e)(4); id. § 717.15(e)(8).

44 Fed. Reg. 77,450-51 (1979).
- 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(b)(1)(v) (1979).
Id.; 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 to 1376 (West 1978).

33
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when a sample analysis indicates a violation of a NPDES permit
effluent limit, then the discharger must file a Discharge Monitoring Report, EPA Form 3320-1, with the Environmental Protection Agency.3 6
Part 716 - Special Peformance Standards
OSM has proposed an amendment of section 716.2 of the initial regulations to provide variances from the requirement that
mined land in steep slope areas be returned to approximate original contour.37 The proposed variance provision differs somewhat
from the variance provision in the permanent program. OSM will
be considering amendments to the permanent program regulations to conform to any adopted regulations. 8 In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Andrus,89 sections 515(d) and (e)'0 of the SMCRA, which require restoration of
steep slopes to approximate original contour, was declared unconstitutional as applied in Virginia41 and operation of those subsec42
tions was enjoined.
Several amendments have been proposed to section 716.7 of
the initial regulations dealing with prime farmland. First, OSM
has proposed that the historical use period of section 716.7(a)(1)
be changed from five years or more out of twenty to five years or
more out of ten.48 The five in twenty historical use period was
struck down in In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.4"
Second, it is proposed that the date from which the historical use
period is measured be changed to the date of acquisition of the
land for mining purposes. 45 Third, OSM proposes that the grandfather exemption of section 716.7(a)(2) be applied to the prime
farmland performance standards as well as to the prime farmland

30 C.F.R. § 715.17(b)(1)(v) (1979).
30 C.F.R. § 716.2(e) (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. 61,313 (1979).
Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 25.
30 U.S.CA. § 1265(d), (e) (West Supp. 1979).
41 Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 25, at 25.
42 Id. at 14.
43 44 Fed. Reg. 33,627 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(a)(1)).
" 456 F.Supp. 1301, 1312 (D.D.C. 1978). See generally Comment, 81 W. VA.
L. REv. 785 (1979).
45 44 Fed. Reg. 33,628 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(b)(2)).
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permit application standards. 4 6 This change was mandated by the
4 7
decision in In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.
Fourth,
a proposed amendment to section 716.7(b) includes within the
category of prime farmland those lands which are taken out of
cropland use for more than five years in ten due to ownership
circumstances which do not relate to the capability of the land to
produce crops. Finally, it is proposed that the term "cropland" be
substituted for the term "cultivated crops" in section 716.7(b)
48
and (d)(1).
Part 717 dards

Underground Mining General Performance Stan-

OSM has suspended, pending further modification by
rulemaking,4 9 certain provisions of section 717.17 of the initial
regulations which establish design criteria for sedimentation
ponds.50 The OSM comments on what requirements will continue
to be enforced after the suspension should be noted. 1
Several changes in section 715.17(b)(1)(v) concerning reporting requirements for a permitee's monitoring of surface water discharges from surface mining and reclamation operations were
noted earlier." The same changes were also made in section
717.17(b)(1)(v) which provides corresponding reporting requirements applicable to persons conducting underground coal mining
and reclamation operations.
Part 718 -

Adoption of State Standards

There are no amendments affecting this section.

Id. (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 716.7 (a)(2)).
452 F.Supp. 327, 340 (D.D.C. 1978). For a summary of the court's determinations in that case, see Comment, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 785, 786-87 n.5 (1979).
48 30 C.F.R. § 716.7(b) (1979); id. § 716.7(d)(1).
4, OSM has published notice of intent to commence rulemaking on the suspended provisions at 44 Fed. Reg. 77,456-57 (1979).
- 30 C.F.R. § 717.17(a)(3)(i) (1979); id. § 717.17(e)(2); id. § 717.17 (e)(3); id.
§ 717.17(e)(4); id. § 717.17(e)(8).
51 44 Fed. Reg. 77,450-51 (1979).
5 See discussion at Part 715, supra.
46

47
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State Enforcement Activities

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 721 -

FederalInspections

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 722

-

Enforcement Procedures

Several amendments have been made to section 722.14 of the
initial regulations dealing with the service of notice of violation,
cessation orders and orders to show cause. First, several changes
have been made in section 722.14(a)(1) with regard to the person
on whom service may be made at the minesite. 5 Second, the new
section 722.14(a)(2) now provides an alternative means of service
in addition to that specified in section 722.14(a)(1).5 Third, the
regulation now provides that service will be complete upon tender
or upon mailing and service will not be incomplete because of refusal to accept.85 Finally, the new section 722.14(d) specifies to
whom OSM must or may furnish a copy of the notice or order,
apart from the person to whom the notice or order is issued.58
Several revisions have been made in section 722.15 of the initial regulations dealing with the requirement of an informal public hearing after issuance of a cessation order. First, the term
"minesite review" has been replaced by the term "informal public
hearing."57 Second, the definition of mining for purposes of section 722.15 has been expanded to include "the processing, cleaning, concentrating, preparing or loading of coal where such operations occur at a place other than at a minesite." ' 8 Third, for
purpose of clarity, sections 722.15(a) now provides that an informal public hearing will be made available after issuance of "cessation orders which requires cessation of mining," rather than after
issuance of "cessation orders."'5 The decision in Virginia Surface
45 Fed. Reg. 2828 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F. R. § 722.14(a)(1)).
45 Fed. Reg. 2828 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.14(a)(2)).
45 Fed. Reg. 2828 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.14(a)(1) and

(2)).

45 Fed. Reg. 2828 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.14(d)).
- 30 C.F.R. §§ 722.15 (1979).
- 30 C.F.R. § 722.15(a) (1979).
59 Id.
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Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Andrus" declared
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the operation of section 521(a)(1) to (3)61 and section 52562 of the SMCRA which pro-

vide for summary issuance of cessation orders. Fourth, a provision
has been added to section 722.15(b) which lists situations in
which the expiration provision of section 722.15(a) will not apply.63 Fifth, the original subsections (c) and (d) (now subsections
(c), (d) and (e)) have been rewritten in order to clarify the provisions concerning notice of the hearing and the procedural aspect
of the hearing." Sixth, the new subsection (f) modifies original
subsection (e) by providing that the OSM must affirm, modify or
vacate the cessation order within five business days of the close of
the hearing, rather than the original fifteen days.6 5 Finally, a new
subsection (h) has been added which deals with viewing the
minesite by the person conducting the hearing.66
OSM has proposed an amendment to section 722.16 of the
initial regulations dealing with procedures governing the suspension or revocation of State permits and rights to mine, by adding
a new subsection (e) which provides that when a permitee fails to
abate a violation within the period set for such abatement, the
Director shall review the permitee's history of violations to determine whether a pattern of violations exists and where circumstances warrant the Director shall issue an order to the permitee
to show cause why the permit should not be suspended or
67
revoked.

Part 723 -

Civil Penalties

OSM has proposed to modify sections 723.12 to 723.18 of the
initial regulations" dealing with civil penalties to conform to the

60 Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 25, at 37-38.
61 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(1) to (3) (West Supp. 1979).
62 Id. § 1275.
63 45 Fed. Reg. 2828-29 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.15(b)).
45 Fed. Reg. 2829 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.15(c), (d) and

(e).
6 45 Fed. Reg. 2829 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.15(f)).
" 45 Fed. Reg. 2829 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.15(h)).
67 45 Fed. Reg. 5541 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.16(e)).
- 30 C.F.R. §9 723.2 to 723.18 (1979).
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corresponding permanent regulations. 9 One proposed change currently not provided for in the permanent regulations would
amend section 723.15(b)(2) to provide that a penalty for failure to
abate a violation may not be assessed for more than thirty days
for each violation.70 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
71
Litigation,
remanded section 732.15(b)(7) of the permanent regulations to the Secretary for revision. The district court in Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Andrus72 declared section 518 of the SMCRA, 73 which provides for
the imposition of civil penalties without a prior hearing, unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
Part 725

-

Reimbursements to States

There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER C -

PERMANENT REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR NON-

FEDERAL AND NON-INDuIAN LANDs
Part 730

-

General Requirements

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 731

-

Submission of State Programs

Section 731.12(a) of the permanent regulations has been
amended to provide that proposed state programs for implementing the permanent regulatory program must be submitted no
later than March 3, 1980, rather than the original deadline of no
later than August 3, 1979.74 This date change was specifically
mandated by the district court in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation." Further, section 731.12(e) has been
69 45 Fed. Reg. 5541-44 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 723.2 to 723.20).
The corresponding permanent regulations are found at 30 C.F.R. §§ 845.1 to
845.20 (1979).
70 45 Fed. Reg. 5543 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 723.15(b)(2)). OSM
has, however, proposed to also add this provision to the permanent regulations. 45
Fed. Reg. 5544 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 845.15(b)(2)).
71No. 79-1144, at 15 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1980) (slip op.).
72 Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 25, at 37.
7

30 U.S.C.A. § 1268 (West Supp. 1979).

1, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,969 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 731.12(a)).
75 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
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added to provide that state programs submitted after August 3,
1979, will be reviewed according to adjusted review schedules to
be established by the Regional Director on a case-by-case basis.7 e
Part 732

-

Proceduresand Criteriafor Approval or Disapproval

Section 732.12(a)(1) of the permanent regulations has been
amended to provide that a notice in the Federal Register of a
public hearing on a proposed state program must indicate that
each requestor may receive, free of charge, one copy of the proposed state statutes and regulations from the Regional Director.y
Part 733 - Maintenanceof State Programs and Substitution of
Federal Program
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 735
tion

-

Grants for Program Development and Administra-

As a result of the extension of the date for submission of
state programs,7 8 several changes have been necessitated in sec-'
tion 735 of the initial regulations which establishes financial assistance to the states in developing their programs for submission.7
First, section 735.11(c) which limited program development
grants to a maximum period of twenty-four months was deleted
in order that a state may continue to receive a grant during the
extended submission period." Second, the new section
735.13(a)(3) establishes the amount of a grant which extends for
76 44

Fed. Reg. 60,969 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 731.12(e)).
44 Fed. Reg. 75,302 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 732.12(a)(1)).
71 See discussion at Part 731, supra.
76 42 Fed. Reg. 62,706-710 (1977) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 735.1 to
735.28). This cite is to the original initial regulations. In these original regulations
the provisions which establish grants for program development, administration
and enforcement are numbered as Part 740. However, in the amendments to the
grant program found at 45 Fed. Reg. 2804 (1980), the grant program is referred to
as Part 735. Original Part 740 and current Part 735 are the same substantively.
The index to the Federal Register, however, does not indicate that notice of a
change in Part number has been published.
7

50

45 Fed. Reg. 2804 (1980).
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more than twenty-four months.8"
Part 736

-

FederalProgram For a State

There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER

D

Part 740

General Requirements

-

-

FEDERAL LANDs PROGRAM

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 741 -

Permits

Section 741.11(a) of the permanent regulations has been
amended to postpone the effective date of operator compliance
with the permanent program on federal lands until approval of a
state program or implementation of a federal program for the
state in which the operation on federal lands is conducted. 2
Part 742 - Bonds and Liability Insurance
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 743

-

Inspection, Enforcement and Civil Penalties

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 744 -

Performance Standards

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 745 -

State-Federal Cooperative Agreements

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Guidelines
On September 19, 1979, OSM published guidelines for contacts with employees and officials of the Department of Interior
(DOI) during its consideration of a State's proposed program.8 8
These guidelines apply to all contacts between employees and of81

Id. (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 735.15(a)(3)).
44 Fed. Reg. 77,446 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 741.11(a)).
44 Fed. Reg. 54,445 (1979).
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ficials of the DOI and the government of a state for which a program has been formally submitted and to all contacts between
employees and officials of DOI and the public."'
Cheryl Lee Davis
SUBCHAPTER F Part 760

-

AREAS UNSUITABLE FOR MINING

General

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 761 - Areas Designated by Act of Congress
On February 6, 1980, OSM published in the Federal Register8" notice of proposed rulemaking which would affect the following sections of Part 761.
Section 522(e)(4) of the SMCRA prohibits, subject to certain
exceptions, coal mining operations within one hundred feet of the
outside right-of-way line of any public road. The proposed
amendment to section 761.588 of the regulatory program would
constrict the definition of public road. This narrowed definition
would include only thoroughfares open to the public8 7 which have
been and are being used for public vehicular travel.
Another proposed amendment to this section would allow
state case law to establish whether one held a valid existing right
to conduct surface mining. The present test is based on the decision in United States v. Polino.8 The test formulated in this case
to determine the presence of a valid existing right to conduct surface mining hinges on the express statement of that right in the
deed conveying the interest to the land in question. The proposed
amendment would allow state case law, where possible, to deter" 44 Fed. Reg. 54,444 (1979). The court in In re Permanent Surface Mining

Regulation Litigation discussed the fact that these guidelines were forthcoming
when it stated that some degree of formality may be appropriate during the postsubmission period. Slip op. at 13-24.
85 45 Fed. Reg. 8241 (1980).
88 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979).
87 45 Fed. Reg. 8244 (1980). Compare In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at 23, where a similar attack on the definition of
"public road" was considered by the court.
" 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W. Va. 1955).
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mine the existing rights appurtenant to the documents executed
in that state.89
As a result of recent litigation in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia,"0 section 761.5(a)(2)(i) has
been remanded to the Secretary for revision. The National Coal
Association (NCA) objected to the "all permits test" stated in
this section, and the court noted that it was its belief that a good
faith attempt to obtain the permits should suffice as the requirement.9 1 Further noted in the court's opinion is the intent of OSM
to propose an amendment to portions of Subchapters F and G
which would delete the limitations on surface mining operations
conducted under approved state programs which will adversely
affect places eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. 2
Section 761.12(e) provides that where mining is proposed
within three hundred feet of any occupied dwelling, the permit
applicant must submit a liability waiver from the owner. The proposed amendments will clarify certain ambiguities in the present
regulation.98 These clarifications can be summarized as follows:
(1) If a waiver was obtained prior to August 3rd, 1977, no
new waiver need be obtained provided that the operator submits the document to show evidence that the pre-Act waiver
was executed.
(2) The waivers obtained after August 3rd, 1977, are effective
against subsequent purchasers with actual knowledge of the
existence of the waiver.u

Part 762 -

Criteria for Designating Areas as Unsuitable for
Surface Coal Mining Operations

There are no amendments affecting this section. The validity
8 45 Fed. Reg. 8244 (1980). Cf. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, supranote 71, at 17, where a similar claim was considered by the court.

90 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71.
at 20.
Id. at 23.

91 Id.
9

'3 Compare In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra
note 71, at 21. In this case the National Coal Association objected to the requirement that the waiver be in writing. The court refused to rule on the objections of
the N.C.A. since they posed only a hypothetical question.
45 Fed. Reg. 8242-43 (1980).
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of sections 762.12(b) and 762.14 were recently upheld, despite various challenges by the National Coal Association, in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation."
Part 764-State Processesfor DesignatingAreas Unsuitablefor
Surface Coal Mining Operations
There have been no amendments proposed which affect this
section. The National Coal Association, Illinois, and Virginia recently attacked section 764.17(a), alleging that the type of hearing
provided under this section was procedurally inadequate. The
court upheld the validity of this provision; hence, the parties' attempt to gain a right to an adjudicative, as opposed to a legislative type hearing, failed.' Sections 764.13(b) and 764.23(a) were
also the subject of claims in this suit; the court also affirmed the
7
validity of these sections.'
Part 765-Designating Lands as Unsuitable for Surface Coal
Mining Operations under a Federal Program for a
State
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 769-Petition Process for Designation of Federal Lands as
Unsuitable for All or Certain Types of Surface Coal
Mining Operations and for Termination of Previous
Designations
There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER G - SURFACE COAL MINING AND RECLAMATION OPERATIONS PERMITS AND COAL EXPLORATION SYSTEMS UNDER REGULATORY PROGRAMS

Part 770-General Requirements for Permit and Exploration
Procedure Systems under Regulatory Programs
There are no amendments affecting this section.

" Supra note 71, at 26-27.
"Id. at 28-29.
7 Id.
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Part 771-GeneralRequirements for Permit Application
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 776-General Requirements for Coal Exploration
There are no amendments affecting this section. The District
of Columbia district court affirmed the validity of section 776.11
in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,8 and
as a result a notice of intent to explore must still be filed for any
operation removing less than two hundred fifty tons of coal. Section 776.17 also withstood the scrutiny of the district court."
Part 778-Surface Mining Permit Applications-Minimum Requirements for Legal, Financial Compliance, and Related Information
There are no amendments affecting this section. Section
778.16(a) was recently challenged in In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation; however, the validity of this section was upheld by the court.1°°
Part 779-Surface Mining Permit Applications-Minimum Requirements for Information on Environmental
Resources
As.a result of recent litigation,10 1 the term "mine plan area,"

defined in section 701.5, has been suspended and remanded to the
Secretary for redefinition. This suspension also affects Parts 779,
780, 783, and 784 to the extent that this term is used in those
sections. The following summarizes other sections affected by the
recent decision in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation:
102
(1) Section 779.14(b)(iii)-(v)- affirmed;

(2) Sections 779.20 and 780.16- remanded to the Secretary;103
(3) Sections 779.21 and 783.21- remanded to the Secretary.'"
Is Id. at 33.

I Id. at 34.
100 Id. at 36.
101 Id. at 35-36.
102 Id. at 37-38.
203 Id. at 38-39.
104 Id. at 39-40.
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Also, on December 31, 1979, OSM published in the Federal
Register0 " notice of future action with regard to the following
rules:
(1) Sections 779.27(b)(4) and 783.27(b)(4)- which deal with
prime farmland investigation;
(2) Sections 783.22 and 784.15- which deal with post-mining
land uses.
Part 780-Surface Mining Permit Applications-Minimum Requirements for Reclamation and Operations Plan
There are no amendments affecting this section; however, see
Part 779 for sections affected by recent litigation. Also noted in
Part 779 are sections on which the OSM plans future action.
Part 782-UndergroundMining Permit Applications - Minimum Requirements for Legal, Financial Compliance,
and Related Information
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 783-UndergroundMining Permit Applications - Minimum Requirements for Information on Environmental Resources
There are no amendments directly affecting this section;
however, see Part 779 for sections affected by recent litigation.
Also noted in Part 779 are sections on which the OSM plans future action.
Part 784-UndergroundMining Permit Applications - Minimum Requirements for Reclamation and Operation
Plan
There are no amendments affecting this sections. See Part
779 for sections scheduled by the OSM for future action.
Part 785-Requirements for Permits for Special Catagories of
Mining
Section 785.19 was substantially attacked in the recent case
1*044

Fed. Reg. 77,454 (1979).
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of In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.106 The'
following summarizes the court's action with regard to this
section:
(1) The general informational requirements of the section
were upheld;' 0"
(2) Section 785.12(d)(2) was remanded "to make clear that
'water quality analyses describing seasonal variations over at
least one full year' need only require an analysis from data collected over a shorter period of time or extrapolations from existing data;"' 8
(3) The small acreage exemption of section 785.19(e)(2) was
remanded to the Secretary; 10 and
(4) Section 785.19(e)(1)(ii) was remanded to the Secretary
with directions "to allow negligible farmland interruption." 110
OSM has published in the FederalRegister"2 its intention to
suspend certain rules pending the outcome of rulemaking. The
following rules have to some extent been suspended:
(1) Section 783.14(a)(l)- which deals with the required geologic description of the land to which an application for underground mining applies;
(2) Section 785.17(a)- which deals with the prime farmland
grandfather clause; and
(3) Section 785.17(b)(3)- which relates to establishing the
"moist bulk density" standard for prime farmland soil
compaction.
Part 786-Review, Public Participation,and Approval or Disapproval of Permit Applications and Permit Terms and
Conditions
There are no amendments affecting this section. There were,
however, several sections attacked in the recent case of In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation."2 Section

'" Supra note 71.
107

Id. at 49.

108 Id. at 50.
109 Id. at 51.
11OId. at 53.

"1 44 Fed. Reg. 77,454 (1979). The Federal Register explains the extent to
which these rules have been suspended and the reader should check the full scope
of the suspensions.
"' Supra note 71.
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786.27(b)(2), which requires that private persons be allowed to accompany inspectors when a private citizen complaint prompted
the inspection, was attacked by Virginia because it felt a similar
requirement was not imposed on the states. The court ruled that
the current wording of this section was sufficient to require that
states comply with its substance.'11 The term "willful violation,"
defined in section 786.5, was also challenged
in this case, but the
114
court upheld the current definition.
Furthermore, OSM has proposed a rule which would revise
the current definition of "irreparable damage to the environment," as defined in section 786.5. The current definition includes
damage that cannot be "or has not been" corrected. 15 The proposed definition would delete the "or has not been" phrase so
that the plain meaning of the term "irreparable" would remain.
OSM notes that while the revision narrows the kind of damages
which can be considered irreparable for purposes of denying permits, the change should not have any effect on the overall scope
of the section. 116
Part 787-Administrative and Judicial Review of Decisions by
Regulatory Authority on Permit Applications
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 787-PermitReviews, Revisions, and Renewals, and Transfer, Sale, and Assignment of Rights Granted Under
Permit
There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER J

-

PERFORMANCE BONDING

The regulations pertaining to bonding, contained in the permanent regulatory program, have been the center of much conflict and change. The district court in In re Permanent Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation recently upheld the validity of the
Secretary's power to prescribe uniform permit and bonding

113 Id. at 13-14.
114

Id. at 40.

11t

45 Fed. Reg. 8243 (1980).

Il'

Id.
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regulations. 117
Pursuant to many of the comments received regarding the
bonding requirements, several proposed amendments were published in the FederalRegister by OSM. These amendments would
affect the various bonding requirements contained in Subchapter
J.11S The significant amendments, additions, deletions, as well as
the effects of recent litigation on each of the sections in Subchapter J are summarized below.
Part 800-General Requirements for Bonding of Surface Goal
Mining and Reclamation Operations Under Regulatory Programs
Several changes are proposed in section 800.5 as a result of
changes elsewhere regarding the bonding requirements. Most notably are the changes regarding the scope of collateral bonding
and self-bonding. OSM proposes to include the pledging of real or
personal property by the permit applicant within the scope of collateral bonding as opposed to its current status as a form of selfbonding. This definitional change is mandated by the proposed
addition of section 806.12(h) 1'9 which allows the regulatory authority to accept a mortgage or perfected first-lien security interest in real or personal property located within the state where the
mining is to occur as a form of collateral bonding.120 The requirement of a "perfected first-lien security interest" may, depending
on the technical construction of that phrase by OSM, preclude
this form of collateral bonding in states such as West Virginia
where, by statute, 2 ' the state has a "first-lien" on real property
for tax purposes.
This proposal is significant for several reasons. First, it

"I Supra note 71, at 33.
218 30 C.F.R. §§ 800, 805-09 (1979).
19 45 Fed. Reg. 6039 (1980). The information which must be filed with the
regulatory authority regarding the pledging of real or personal property as security
is set out in the proposed section.
1"0 Id.
'11 W.

VA. CODE § 11A-1-2 (1974 Replacement Vol.). This section provides in
part, "There shall be a lien on all real property for the taxes assessed thereon
.
... See also, Berrymont Land Co. v. Davis Creek Land & Coal Co., 119 W. Va.

186, 192 S.E. 577 (1937), where the state-created lien was held to supercede a

federal lien.
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removes the posting of real and personal property of the permit
applicant from the stringent requirements of self-bonding 22 and
would seem to facilitate the ability of permit applicants to secure
bond coverage. Secondly, it illustrates OSM's tendency to relax
some of the more stringent standards for bonding contained in
the present regulatory program. The re-opening of the regulations
for self-bonding to the rulemaking process is an example of this
trend, which is evident throughout section 800.123
Proposed amendments to section 800.11 would allow, as an
alternative bonding strategy, the use of cumulative bonding.
Under this procedure, the permitee would file a schedule of his
proposed land use and reclamation plan. The bond amount would
fluctuate according to the portion of the permit area disturbed
and that portion fully reclaimed. 124 This obviates the need under
the present program for the duplicative process of executing a
new bond on each increment of land mined. The initial bond
amount would be the full cost of reclamation of the first increment of the permit area disturbed.
The addition of cumulative bonding to the arsenal of alternatives available to operators should facilitate both the realization
of the goals of the SMCRA and the ability of the operators to
secure adequate bonding. As noted by OSM, "[t]he key element
in successfully reducing the bond amount is to attain successful
1 25
reclamation in a timely manner.9
Part 801-Bonding Requirements for Underground Coal Mines,
Coal Processing Plants, Associated Structures, and
other Coal-Related Facilitiesand Structures
This part of the regulatory plan is a proposed addition to the
permanent regulations which would establish bonding require2 The stringent requirements for self-bonding received a great deal of critical comment and, as such, OSM has repealed those requirements as they were
stated in section 806.12(b) of the permanent regulatory program. The proposed
standards are set out in a new section, section 806.14, as they have been re-opened

for rulemaking. 45 Fed. Reg. 6035 (1980).
12345 Fed. Reg. 6035 (1980). See OSM's comments on the proposed amend-

ments.

124 A

good discussion is offered by OSM as to how cumulative bonding will

work. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6029 (1980).
122

Id. at 6030.
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ments and procedures for underground mines, coal processing
plants, refuse areas, and associated structures and facilities.128
Several of the significant aspects of the proposed rules are discussed below.
Due to the long-term nature of the facilities to which this
section will apply, the proposed regulations would allow the operator to use "escrow bonding. '127 While the facility would initially
have to be fully bonded to obtain the permit, an escrow account
could be set up, funded by production generated collateral, which
would ultimately replace the bond. One reason for the allowance
of escrow bonding in this section is the apprehensiveness of most
sureties to accept such long-term liability. Under the proposed
section, the operator would secure a short-term bond from a
surety and then ultimately, through an escrow account, provide
the necessary funds for reclamation. This section does not apply
to facilities whose useful life does not exceed five years, or to the
coverage 8of unplanned subsidence or unforeseen mine
12
drainage.
Part 805-Amount and Duration of Performance Bond
Under the present program, the extended liability period begins with the last year of augmented seeding, fertilizing, irrigation
or other work. Furthermore, the present program contained in
section 805.13(b) provides that "[t]he period of liability shall begin again whenever augmented seeding, fertilizing, irrigation or
other work is required or conducted on the site prior to bond release,' 1 29 unless the post-mining land use plan provides for ongoing management.
A proposed amendment would allow such activities within
the extended liability period without an accompanying extension
of the liability period provided that:
"' This section is necessitated by SMCRA § 16(d), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1216(d)
(West Supp. 1979), which requires the standards relating to bonding to also apply
to the surface effects of underground mines.
' Escrow bonding has been proposed as an addition to the general allowable
forms of bonding in section 806.11. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6038 (1980), and the specific
section dealing with escrow bonding in section 806.13. Id. at 6040.
128 Id. at 6030-31.
128 30 C.F.R. § 805.13(b)(3) (1979).
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(1) Such practice is approved by the regulatory authority,
and
(2) Such practices are normal within the region for umnined
lands having land uses similar to the approved post-mining
land use of the area covered by the bond.13
One purpose for the relaxation in this regulation is that the present regulation deters the use of good husbandry practices.
Under the present plan the bond must be held over the entire permit area if any increment of the permit area requires continued management. A proposed amendment 131 would allow the
regulatory authority the latitude to sever that portion requiring
continued management from the original bonded area, provided
certain conditions are met. 32
Another proposed section 33 would limit the liability of the
permitee in the event that an approved post-mining land use is
not completed. Commentators suggested, and OSM agreed, that
the bond should cover only completion of the reclamation plan to
the extent the operators control the outcome. The justification for
this added section is that the permitee should not be responsible
for the activities of the third party landowners over whom they
exercise no control. There are, however, certain circumstances
under which this liability limitation would not extend. These situations are set out in the proposed rule.
Proposed changes in section 805.14(a) would require notice of
proposed adjustments of the bond amount be given to not only
the permitee, but also to the surety and any other person with a
property interest in collateral posted under Subchapter J. However, to perfect this right, persons other than the permitee must
formally request such notice within a specified time. In accordance with the change in subsection (a), it is proposed that subsection (b)13' be alerted to allow other persons involved in the
130 45 Fed. Reg. 6038 (1980).
131 Id.; see § 805.13(c).

I" Id. § 805.13(c) notes that the regulatory authority may approve the severance only if the area sought to be severed: (1) is not significant in extent in relation to the entire area under bond; and (2) is limited to a distinguishable contiguous portion of the bonded area.
,33 Id.; see § 805.13(f).
1" The validity of this section, as it appears in the permanent regulatory program, was recently upheld in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-
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bond coverage to request a reduction in the bond amount.
Part 806-Form, Conditions, and Terms of Performance Bonds
and Liability Insurance
A proposed amendment to this section would expand the allowable forms of bonding to include, in addition to those stated in
the present regulatory program, escrow bonding and combinations of all the accepted methods. While self-bonding remains as
an accepted alternative, the current requirements contained in
subsection (b) have been deleted and the section has been reopened for rulemaking in newly proposed section 806.14.185
While the proposed regulations for self-bonding retain much
of the same language present in section 806.11(b), they should be
read closely to detect all of the changes. Some of the significant
changes are discussed below.
One of the most objected to requirements of the current program is the requirement that operators must show a net worth of
six-times the total bond amount.186 This requirement is deleted
from the proposed regulations. It is argued that the interests of
the regulatory authority are adequately protected by the requirement that a detailed financial statement 'be submitted by the
37
applicant.2
Many persons who submitted comments pbjected strongly to
the requirement that the operator show ten years of continuous
operations, and that a detailed financial statement be filed with
the regulatory authority.2" However, OSM refused to yield on
these requirements and they remain in the proposed section.
Under the current program, the incapacity of a surety or a
bank through bankruptcy, insolvency or suspension or revocation
of its license immediately puts the operator in violation of section
800.11(b);13 " accordingly, the operator is required to discontinue
surface mining until new bonding is approved.1 40 A proposed
tion, supra note 71, at 45.
135 45 Fed. Reg. 6040 (1980).
I

See § 806.11(b)(2).

137

45 Fed. Reg. 6035 (1980).

13$
139

Id.
44 Fed. Reg. 15,386 (1979).

140

Id. at 15,389. See § 806.12(e)(6)(iii).
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amendment141 to section 806.12 retreats from this unreasonable
sanction and would give the operators a reasonable time, not to
exceed 120 days, to secure new bonding. The operator would be
allowed to continue mining during the interim period; however,
the regulatory authority would make weekly inspections to ensure
compliance with the proper procedures. If the operator either
strays from acceptable practices, or fails to secure new bonding, a
cessation order would issue against the operator.
An additional change in this section would clarify the regulations regarding the use of irrevocable letters of credit. 142 Furthermore, while section 806.12(h) 1, 3 incorporates much of the present
language of section 806.11(b)(4), one addition would allow lands
included in the permit area to be used as collateral for bonding
purposes after Phase H of the reclamation plan has been completed.'" This proposed addition should both lessen the hardships presented by the bonding requirements, and should provide
incentive for the permitee to complete the reclamation plan in
accordance with the schedule.
Part 807-Procedures,Criteria,and Schedule for Release of Performance Bond
As a result of recent litigation,145 section 807.11(e) has been
remanded to the Secretary since it fails to articulate that, in the
words of the SMCRA, "the regulatory authority may arrange with
the applicant... access to the proposed mining area for the purpose of gathering information relevant to the proceedings. "146
Several non-substantive amendments to section 807.12 would
clarify the guidelines for partial release of liability under the
bond for increments for which either Phase I or Phase II of the
reclamation plan have been completed.147 The one substantive
change in this section concerns the definition of Phase ]I. In ac141 45 Fed. Reg. 6039 (1980). See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation, supra note 25, at 41.
14. Id. See proposed § 806.12(g)(2).
143 Id.
144 45 Fed. Reg. 6039 (1980). See proposed § 806.12(h).
143 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
42.
146See SMCRA § 513(b), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1273(b) (West Supp. 1979).
17 45 Fed. Reg. 6041 (1980).
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cordance with the changes in Section 805.13(f),148 OSM proposes

to amend section 807.12(e)(3) to remove the requirement that operators implement the post-mining land use. Hence, to complete
Phase ]II, the operator need only to perform reclamation
such
149
that the land would support the post-mining land use.
Part 808-PerformanceBond Forfeiture Criteria and Procedure
OSM proposes to add section 808.11(c) 1 50 to allow the regulatory authority to authorize the surety to complete the reclamation
plan in case of forfeiture by the permitee. This change is in accordance with the proposed amendment to section 806.12(e)(4)
whereby the surety could, upon the proper showing, opt to complete the reclamation plan as opposed to forfeiting the bond. 5 '
It is proposed that section 808.12 be amended to clarify that
"any bond deposited for an entire permit area or any increment
may be forfeited to assure all aspects of reclamation of any portion of the permit area."15 2 The proposed addition of subsection
(d) assures that the funds forfeited to the regulatory authority
would be applied to the reclamation of the specific permit area
covered by the bond.
Some persons submitting comments thought it necessary to
clarify the fact that minor violations could not be cause for forfeiture of the bond amount since the regulations establish a separate
penalty procedure for violations. OSM agreed with this view, and
made it clear, through the proposed amendment to section
808.13(a)(2),L53 that for forfeiture to occur the regulatory authority must determine that it may be necessary to have someone
other than the operator correct or complete the operation.
As a result of recent litigation,154 section 808.14 has been re148 See text accompanying note 133 supra.

45 Fed. Reg. 6035 (1980).
:50 Id.
181 Id. at 6041. See also the discussion of the accompanying amendment id. at
6033.
:5 Id. at 6036.
" Id. at 6042. But see, In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at 42-43.
1 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
"
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manded to the Secretary.
Part 809-Bonding and Insurance Requirements for Anthracite
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Larry W. Blalock
SUBCHAPTER

K-

PERMANENT PROGRAM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

Part 810-General Provisions
The general objective of Subchapter K "is to insure that coal
exploration and surface coal mining and reclamation operations
are conducted in manners which are compatible with the environmental, social, and esthetic needs of the Nation." 5 The various
objectives sought to be achieved have not been amended since the
promulgation of the permanent regulatory program. However,
OSM has taken under consideration a petition to amend Subchapter K and the performance standards; more particularly,
amendments to the regulations concerning sediment control and
surface mining operations are being considered. 56
Part 815--Coal Exploration
Any exploration for coal which "substantially disturbs the
natural land surface" may be subject to regulation under this
part.'1 Although the removal of more or less than 250 tons of
coal subjects the operator to different criteria for regulatory approval, any coal exploration is subject to the performance standards listed under section 815.15.1"
No express amendments to part 815 have occurred since the
promulgation of the permanent regulatory program. However,
part 815 incorporates by reference amended regulations in part
155

30 C.F.R. § 810.2 (1979).

44 Fed. Reg. 60,226 (1979).
'

30 C.F.R. § 815.1 (1979).

I Id. In addition, a notice of intent to explore under 30 C.F.R. §§ 776.11, 12,

13 must be filed before any exploration can take place under part 815. The regula-

tions dealing with the notice of intent for coal exploration of less than 250 tons
(30 C.F.R_ § 776.11) were upheld by the district court for the District of Columbia.
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at 33.
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816. Therefore, cross references should be made to part 816 in the
following materials.
Part 816 -

Surface Mining Activities

Part 817 -

UndergroundMining Activities

These two parts "set forth the minimum environmental protection performance standards to be adopted and implemented
under regulatory programs for surface [and underground] mining
activities.

' 159

Because the provisions for underground mining

"track" the surface mining provisions, reference will be made to
part 816160 unless one of the few provisions unique to underground mining has been affected.
The surface mining industry opposes many of the non-site
specific regulations promulgated under the SMCRA.26 1 In re-

sponse to the submission of a petition to amend Subchapter K,
OSM published several suspensions of the rules contained in part
816. OSM noted that "the primary reason for the suspension of
the existing OSM rainfall exemption is recognition of the fact
that the record does not contain substantial data correlating sus62
pended solids effluent quality with particular rainfall levels.'

OSM's limitations on the total suspended solids contained in
the effuent discharged by surface coal mining and reclamation operations have been closely related to those promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency. 68 Recent studies have called
into question OSM's design criteria for ponds, effluent limitations
and the exemptions to the limitations. Therefore the following
suspensions were effected.
The permanent rules provided for an exemption to the limi30 C.F.R. § 816.1 (1979).
To convert a part 816 surface mine citation to a part 817 underground
mining citation, one merely has to interchange the suffixes of the numbers. Thus,
a reference to 30 C.F.R. § 816.103-Backfilling and grading: Covering coal and
acid and toxic-forming materials" means that the same amendments were made to
30 C.F.R. § 817.103, in the underground mining section.
161 See, In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301
(D.D.C. 1978). See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation,
supra note 71.
162 44 Fed. Reg. 77,449 (1979).
''
E.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.22(c), 25(c), 32(c), 35(b), 42(b), 46(b), as amended.
,

160
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tations on the total suspended solids contained in the effluent
when there was a precipitation event equal to or larger than a 10year 24-hour precipitation event and if the facilities were
designed and maintained in accordance with the requirements of
part 816.1" While the OSM regulated
remains suspended, the
5
EPA exemption will be substituted.'
Many of the OSM design criteria for sedimentation ponds
were suspended pending the final EPA studies which are scheduled for publication in the spring of 1980.
The methods for determining minimum storage volume and
detention time will be suspended, but the general requirements that ponds provide a minimum sediment storage volume
[30 O.F.R. § 816.46(b)] and that ponds hold the volume of
water resulting from a 10 year
24-hour precipitation event
1
(§ 816.46(c)) will be retained. "
Because the permanent regulatory program has been the subject of litigation,"' OSM decided to suspend certain regulations
pending rulemaking and give notice of intent to publish interpretations of other rules involved in the litigation. 68 For instance,
OSM intends to amend the revegetation standards for success in
the underground mining provisions where the acreage affected is
forty acres or less and the average rainfall is more than twenty-six
inches.169

Generally, these notices do not release the states from sub44 Fed. Reg. 77,448 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 816.42).
161See note 9 supra. The EPA provision will be revised to read as follows:
'"

Any overflow, increase in volume of a discharge or discharge from a bypass system caused by precipitation or snowmelt shall not be subject to
the limitations set forth in paragraph (a) of this section. This exemption
shall be available only if the facility is designed, constructed, and maintained to contain or treat the volume of water which would fall on the
areas covered by this subpart during a 10-year 24-hour or larger precipitation event (or snowmelt of equivalent volume). The operator shall
have the burden of demonstrating to the appropriate authority that the
prerequisites to an exemption set forth in this subsection have been
met.
Its 44 Fed. Reg. 77,450 (1979). In particular, portions of 30 C.F.R.
§ 816.46(b), (c), (d) and (h) have been suspended.
167 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71.
16 44 Fed. Reg. 77,454 (1979).
146 30 C.F.R. § 817..116(d) (1979).
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mitting plans which are compatible with the objectives of Title V
of the SMCRA. However, OSM recognized that flexibility is
needed pending the outcome of the litigation; thus, the operator
is temporarily able to use an alternative subdrainage system if he
can ensure the structural integrity of the wastebank and the pro170
tection of ground or surface water quality.
In addition, OSM has recognized that the special precautions
regarding recharge capacity of water leaving underground mines
is unproductive, thus rendering unnecessary a monitoring
1 71

requirement.

i
In conjunction with the earlier notices to suspend, concerning
effluent limitations for total suspended solid discharges for surface mining and reclamation operations during rainstorms and
sedimentation pond design criteria, OSM noticed
its intent to
172

commence rulemaking upon new standards.

In response to the numerous time extensions that have taken
place, OSM has had to extend "incorations by reference" in the
regulations until July 1, 1980.17
OSM has proposed rulemaking concerning the "disposal of
acid forming, toxic forming, combustible or other identified
materials exposed, used, or produced during mining." 17 4 The present regulations call for covering such materials with four feet of a
neutral substance;1 75 however, it is felt that the SMCRA would
allow for covering or treating these materials.176 The permanent
rules will be amended to allow for the covering or treating of the
materials exposed, used, or produced during mining.
Litigation over the permanent regulatory program
culminated with the issuance of an opinion early in the spring of
1980 from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the case of In re Permanent Surface Mining Regula170 30 C.F.R. § 816.32(a) (1979).
1 30 C.F.R. § 817.52(a)(1) (1979).
172 44 Fed. Reg. 77,456 (1979).
-- 45 Fed. Reg. 8240 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.49(a)(5),
816.65(e)(2), 816.85(c)(2)).

45 Fed. Reg. 8243 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 816.103(a)(6)).
37 See 30 C.F.R. § 816.103(a).
IL7 SMCRA § 515(b)(14), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(14) (West Supp. 1979).
174
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tion Litigation.177 The following discussion outlines the decision
of the court with regard to the performance standards which are
contained in part 816 and part 817.
1.

Segregation of Subsoil

The court recognized that "Section 515(b) [of the SMCRA]
authorizes segregation if the topsoil cannot sustain vegetation or
if other strata enhance postmining revegetation. ' 17 8 Therefore,
challenges to the subsoil provisions contained in the permanent
regulations were not allowed.179
2. Regulation of Exploslves
The regulation of explosives under the permanent regulatory
program was upheld by the court.180 The court held that the
"provisions demonstrate that the Secretary has promulgated national standards for explosives; however, they may be implemented and varied by the local regulatory authority in accordance
with and varied by the local regulatory agency in accordance with
site specific conditions." The regulations are therefore consistent
with the SMCRA. 181
3.

Control of Dams Impounding Waste

Briefly, the court held that section 515(b)(10) of the SMCRA182 authorizes the protection of the hydrologic balance, and
therefore the 3 regulations concerning dams impounding wastes
1
were proper. 8

1? Treating the toxic materials is provided for in the interim regulations, upheld by court decision. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 715.14(i), 717.14(e); In re Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1310 (D.D.C. 1978). See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71.
179 C.. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. 1980) (slip op.).
179

Id. at 54.

180 30 C.F.R. § 816.22(d) (1979).
181See 30 C.F.R. §§ 816.61-67 (1979).
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at 56.
162 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(10) (West Supp. 1979).
I" In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at

56-58.
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4. Cover of Hazardous Material
The court recognized that the failure of the regulations to allow the operator to treat such materials rather than just covering
them with a minimum of four feet of nontoxic, noncombustible
materials was improper.1 OSM had185anticipated this ruling and
previously had initiated rulemaking.
5. Coal Operator's Use of Land After Reclamation
The court struck down the regulations that required an operator who proposes "range or pasture land for post mining land
use" to actually use the land "for grazing for the last two years of
bond liability."1 86 The court noted that section 515(b)(19) of the
SMCRA was unpersuasive as authority to support the government's position, and, in addition, the language in the House report on the section spoke in permissive rather than mandatory
terms.187 Accordingly, the court held that the regulations which
required operators to actually engage in farming while the property was still under bond were impermissible. The court held that
the statutory sections relied upon by the government188 "direct
the operator to demonstrate capability of prime farmlands to support pre-mining productivity. This capability can be demonstrated by a soil survey."189
6. Period for Measuring Success
The regulations relating to the time period for which the operator would be responsible for the successful revegetation were
also challenged. The court held that the regulations requiring a
five or ten year responsibility period (depending upon whether
the area had more or less than 26 inches of rainfall yearly should
not be required to begin when the vegetation reaches ninety per30 C.F.R. § 816.103(a)(1) (1979).
See note 25, supra.
'
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
58; 30 C.F.R. § 816.115 (1979).
18 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
59.
1
SMCRA §§ 510(d)(1), 515(b)(7), 515(b)(20), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1260(d)(1),
1265(b)(7), 1265(b)(20) (West Supp. 1979).
180 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
1
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cent of the natural cover in the area.190 Instead, the court suggested a middle ground-to have the liability "period begin 'after
the last year of augmented seeding, fertilizing, [and]
irrigation.' "191
7.

Restoration of Previously Mined Land.

Challenges to the requirement that land that was previously
mined but unreclaimed must be restored to the "highest and best
use... compatible with surrounding areas" were held to be unfounded. 1 "9The court examined the legislative history of the provisions and determined that by referring to "potential utility,"
rather than "low value," the Senate report made it clear that restoration of previously mined land must be upgraded to support
its utility for productive use.9 's
8. Letters of Commitment for Alternate Post-mining Land Use
The court held that requirements for legally binding commitment letters regarding alternate post-mining land use"" were not
required by the SMCRA. The SMCRA "requires only a 'reasonable likelihood' or alternate use that is higher or better than previ193
ous use."
9.

Surface Owner Protection Against Subsidence

In relation to the regulations regarding subsidence (which are
peculiar to the underground mining regulation standards), the
court held that the regulations were consistent with the SMCRA
in providing for "one of three alternatives: 1) restore the damaged
structure and the land; 2) purchase the damaged structure and
restore the land; or 3) compensate the owner and restore the
land.,,'"

190 30 C.F.R. § 816.116(b) (1979).
11 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at

61.

1,2

Id. at 61-62; 30 C.F.R. § 816.133(b)(1) (1979).

"93

In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at

1,

30 C.F.R. § 816.133(c)(4), (c)(9)(i) (1979).

62.

15 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
63. See SMCRA § 515(b)(2), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
I In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
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10. Buffer Zone for Underground Mining
Briefly, the court held that the regulations relating to such
buffer zones were clearly upheld by the language and intent of the
SMCRA.11
Part 818 -

ConcurrentSurface and UndergroundMining

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 819 - Auger Mining
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 820 -

Anthracite Mines in Pennsylvania

There have been no amendments to this section, except for
the extension of incorporation by reference dates to July 1,
1980.198

Part 822

-

Operations in Alluvial Valley Floors

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 823 -

Operations on Prime Farmlands

As a result of pending litigation,199 OSM has suspended the
prime farmland grandfather clause.2 00 However, the comments to
the suspension note that "[w]here the suspended regulations have
explicit underpinnings in the SMCRA, States must still include
corresponding
statutory provisions
in
their program
20
applications. 2
The SMCRA provides the following exemption for the prime
farmland standards:
63-64; 30 C.F.R. § 817.124 (1979).

197 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 71, at
65; 30 C.F.R. § 817.126 (1979).
19 45 Fed. Reg. 8240 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 820.11(d)).
1

See note 25, supra.

30 C.F.R. § 785.17(a) and incorporated in part 823.11(a). This provision
holds that the prime farmland reconstruction standards do not apply to land
where mining was authorized prior to August 3, 1977.
201 44 Fed. Reg. 77,454 (1979).
200
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Nothing in this subsection shall apply to any permit is-

sued prior to the date of enactment of this Act [August 3,
1977], or to any revisions or renewals thereof, or to any ex-

isting surface mining operations for which a permit was issued
prior to the date of enactment of this Act.2 02
Thus, little will change while the litigants argue over the language
of the regulatory provisions.
Part 824 -

Mountaintop Removal

There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 825 - Special Bituminous Mines in Wyoming
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Part 826 -

Steep Slope Mining

OSM has indictated that the variance procedures contained
in this part are expected to be amended. OSM has decided to add
a variance procedure to the interim regulations, and language in
the supplemental information to the proposed rulemaking indicates that permanent program variance procedures will be
amended to comport with the new variance procedures for the
interim program.2 03
In addition, in litigation concerning the SMCRA, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia held
that the portions of the SMCRA dealing with steep slope mining
would be permanently enjoined.2 "
Part 827 - Coal ProcessingPlants and Support Facilities Not
Located At or Near the Minesite or Not within the Permit Area
for a Mine
There are no amendments affecting this section.
:11 SMCRA § 510(d)(2); 30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(d)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
(1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§ 716,
103 44 Fed. Reg. 61,313
785.16(b)(2), 826.15)).
20 Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation, Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, supra
note 71.
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Part 828 -

In Situ Processing

There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER L

Part 840

-

-

INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

State Regulatory Authority Inspection and Enforcement

In reference to enforcement authority, the permanent regulatory program provides that "[t]he civil and criminal penalty provisions of each State program shall contain penalties which are no
less stringent than those set forth in section 518 of the Act and
shall be consistent with 30 C.F.R. Part 845. " 2 05
In litigation over the permanent regulatory program, the
State of Virginia successfully challenged the imposition upon the
states of the point system contained in Part 845.208 The court
agreed that section 518(i) did not expressly provide for the point
system, and that the "imposition of this requirement upon the
states is inconsistent with the Act. '20 7 In remanding the regulation, the court further noted that the mere recitation of section
503(a)(7), without a showing of the rational relationship between
the regulation and the SMCRA, "fails to meet the standard by
which this court must adjudicate the regulations." 208
The court also held that the warrantless inspection provisions could apply either to coal explorations or to unpermitted
coal mining and reclamation operations. 209 This holding is to be
expected after the court's previous ruling on warrantless searches
210
in the permit area proper.
Part 842

-

Federal Inspections

There are no amendments affecting this section.

22"

30 C.F.R. § 840.13(a) (1979).
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, supra note 25, at

15.
201
208

Id.
Id.

209 Id.
210

at 65-66.
See n re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1317

(D.D.C. 1978).
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-

Federal Enforcement

OSM propounded final rules to clarify the procedures for informal public hearings under the (interim and) permanent regulations.2 11 The introduction to the final rules succintly summarizes
the changes made to section 843.15 in regard to informal public
hearings:
-First, subsection (b) has been rewritten to clarify how an
informal public hearing may be waived or the time for holding
it extended.

-Second, the second sentence of subsection (g) has been
deleted. This sentence provided that no statements made or
evidence introduced at an informal public hearing could be introduced in a subsequent hearing to impeach a witness. This
deletion is being made because the Office has reconsidered this
sentence and believes that it would result in the exclusion of a
great deal of evidence.
-Third, subsection (h) has been added to indicate that the
decision as to whether a minesite should be viewed during the
hearing is that of the person conducting the hearing.212
Subsection (a) of section 843.15 has also been amended
slightly to add that "[no] hearing will-be required where the condition, practice or violation in question has been abated or the
hearing has been waived."' 1 In addition, the definition of "mining" has been expanded to include "the processing, cleaning, concentrating, preparing or loading of coal where such operations oc'' 2 14
cur at a place other than at a minesite.
OSM has also proposed rules regarding the provisions governing the assessment of penalties for violations of the permanent
regulatory program. Under this part, OSM has proposed the addition of the following language to clarify when the suspension or
revocation of permits may take place:
(f) Whenever a permitee fails to abate a violation contained in a notice of violation or a cessation order within the
abatement period set in the notice or order as subsequently
extended, the Director shall review the permitee's history of
,11 45 Fed. Reg. 2626 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 843.15).
212 45 Fed. Reg. 2626 (1980).
:13 45 Fed. Reg. 2626, 2629 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 843.15(a)).
14

Id.
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violations to determine whether a pattern of violations exists
pursuant to this section, and shall issue as appropriate an order to show cause.""5
Part 845

-

Civil Penalties

In addition to the proposed rules cited in Part 843, OSM has
proposed clarifications for the assessment of penalties for separate violations for each day216 Previously, an unlimited $750 a
day penalty for failure to abate was thought permissible. OSM
recognized, however, that the unlimited penalty has led to an
"alarmingly high" amount of total fines which "[i]ronically...
may actually deter effective enforcement by forcing operators into
bankruptcy and the ultimate abandonment of an unreclaimed
site." 17 Because of the language contained in the authorizing section of the SMCRA,'2 1 8 OSM now believes the congressional intent
was to subject operators to a maximum assessment period of
21 9
thirty days for failure to abate penalties.
In addition, "penalties will begin to accumulate on the date
that the Office actually reinspects the minesite and determines
that the violation cited in the notice of violation or cessation order has not been abated."2 20 Other provisions in section 845.13(b)
regarding remedies for the "oppressed" operator or stays pending
rulings by the court remain unchanged.22 1
SUBCHAPTER M -TRAINING PROGRAM FOR BLASTERS AND MEMBERS
OF BLASTING CREW: CERTIFICATION OF BLASTERS

Part 850 -

Programs

Proposed rules concerning the training and certification of
blasters first appeared in the Federal Register on September 18,
1978. 22 2 In response to industry protests about the stringent pro-

216

45 Fed. Reg. 5551, 5544 (1980).
Id. (to be codified in 30 C.FR. § 845.15(b)).

217

45 Fed. Reg. 5541 (1980).

215

I" SMCRA § 518(c); 30 U.S.CJA. § 1268(c) (West Supp. 1979).
219 Id.
'0 45 Fed. Reg. 5541 (1980).

Id. at 5544.
1 43 Fed. Reg. 41,934 (1978).

21
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posed rules, OSM reproposed the rules.2 3 Although comments
were closed on August 29, 1979, no further action appears to have
been taken regarding this Subchapter.
Generally, the reproposed rules lessen the requiiements upon
the operator and recognize the immense financial burden placed
upon the operator by the rules as originally proposed. The blasting rules contained in the interim program and related materials
should be consulted pending final acceptance of the new blasting
22
rules for the permanent regulatory program. 4
SUBCHAPTERS N AND 0 SUBCHAPTER P -

[reserved]

PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES

There are no amendments affecting this section.
SUBCHAPTER

R-

AB

mOND MINE LAN RECLAMATION

Parts 870 to 888
The final rules covering this Subchapter were published on
October 25, 1975,225 except for part 870, which was finalized on
December 13, 1977.226 Because most agency action concerning
Subchapter R has been of a general nature, the different parts
will not be set out separately here.227 OSM has published notice
S
of the availability of the draft environmental impact statement. 28
In order "to assist States, Indian Tribes, [the] U.S. Department of Agriculture, and OSM in interpreting and applying the
general reclamation requirements for individual programs and
223

44 Fed. Reg. 38,318-27 (1979).

214See,

Note, Regulation of Blasting Practices Under the Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. Rav. 763 (1979).

2 43 Fed. Reg. 49,932 (1978).
This section was originally designated as Part 837. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,713

126

(1977).

'" The various parts cover the following: Part 870, Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund - Fee Collection and Coal Production Reporting; Part 872, Abandoned Mine Reclamation Funds; Part 874, General Reclamation Requirements;
Part 877, Rights of Entry; Part 879, Acquisition, Management, and Disposition of

Lands and Water; Part 882, Reclamation of Private Land; Part 884, State Reclamation Plans; Part 886, State Reclamation Grants; Part 888, Indian Reclamation
Program.
11244 Fed. Reg. 63,737 (1979).
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projects contained in the SMCRA and the regulations," 229 OSM
published "proposed guidelines" in lieu of regulations; copies of
these guidelines are available from OSM.2
The General Accounting Office has also published its confirmation that the record keeping and reporting requirements
of the
21
various parts of Subchapter R meet its approval.
SUBCHAPTER S -

MINING AND MINERAL INSTITUTES

Part 890
There are no amendments affecting this section.
Lawrence W. Hancock
III. LITIGATION
UNION CARBIDE CoRP. v. ANDRUS

On July 17, 1979, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia decided two consolidated
cases, Union Carbide Corp. v. Andrus3 2 and Cannelton Industries, Inc. v. Andrus,5 3 which challenged the manner in which the
Secretary of the United States Department of Interior had implemented the interim-phase enforcement provisions of the SMCRA .2

The plaintiffs in these two cases operated surface mines,

underground mines having surface impacts, or both, in West Virginia. They alleged that the Secretary's practice of issuing notices
of violation and cessation orders without prior notification of the
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources was contrary to
the requirements of section 521(a)(1) of the SMCRA. Preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief restraining the Secretary's enforcement activities without first complying with the notice provi=" 44 Fed. Reg. 64,254 (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. 64,255 (1979).
44 Fed. Reg. 60,285 (1979).
C.A. No. 79-2142 (S.D. W. Va. July 17, 1979) (slip op.).
C.P. No. 79-2163 (S.D. W. Va. July 17, 1979) (slip op.) These two consolidated cases are hereinafter referred to as Union Carbide v. Andrus.
' Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977); 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201 et seq. (West
Supp. 1979). The following six sections of the SMCRA are discussed in this analysis: 101, 502, 503, 518, 521 and 526. The corresponding U.S.C.A. sections are 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201, 1252, 1253, 1268, 1271 and 1276 (West Supp. 1979).
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sion of section 521(a)(1) was requested. The plaintiffs further
sought injunctive relief with regard to the issuance of federal notices of violation and cessation orders concerning the surface effects of underground mining under section 521(a)(3), as such mining is not conducted by "permittees" under the SMCRA.
These requests placed four issues before the court: (1)
whether notice to the state regulatory authority is a prerequisite
to federal action under section 521(a)(1); (2) whether the plaintiffs are "permittees" under section 521(a)(1); (3) whether the defendants are equitably estopped from enforcing the interim regulatory program in West Virginia; and (4) whether the plaintiffs'
mining activities are conducted on lands on which such operations are regulated by the state. In resolving these disputes, the
court held that (1) notice to the state regulatory authority is not a
prerequisite to federal enforcement of the interim program; (2)
the plaintiffs were "permittees" under the SMCRA; (3) the defendants could not be equitably estopped from enforcing the interim
program in West Virginia; and (4) the plaintiffs' mines are on
lands on which such operations are subject to state regulation.
1.

The Notice Requirement

The dispute concerning the necessity of notice to the state
regulatory authority prior to enforcement actions by the Secretery during the interim program presented the question "whether
section 521(a)(1)1 5 is operative during the interim phase of the
30 U.S.C.A. 1271(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979). This section provides:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, including
receipt of information from any person, the Secretary has reason to believe that any person is in violation of any requirement of this Act or
any permit condition required by this Act, the Secretary shall notify the

2-18

State regulatory authority, if one exists, in the State in which such violation exists. If no such State authority exists or the State regulatory
authority fails within ten days after notification to take appropriate action to cause said violation to be corrected or to show good cause for
such failure and transmit notification of its action to the Secretary, the
Secretary shall immediately order Federal inspection of the surface coal
mining operation at which the alleged violation is occurring unless the
information available to the Secretary is a result of a previous Federal
inspection of such surface coal mining operation. The ten-day notification period shall be waived when the person informing the Secretary
provides adequate proof that an imminent danger of significant environ-
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Act.' 232 The court examined sections 502237 and 52125 and decided that Congress did not intend for section 521(a)(1) to be effective during the interim program. Instead, federal enforcement
of the SMCRA, under section 521(a)(3), 23 9 is subject to the notice
requirement of section 521(a)(1) only during the permanent regulatory program.
Section 502(e) sets forth three primary characteristics of the
Secretary's enforcement authority during the interim program.
First, the Secretary is given the nondiscretionary duty to inspect
sites without advance notice to the operator to determine compliance with the interim performance standards. These inspections
must be made at least once every six months. Next, the Secretary

mental harm exists and that the State has failed to take appropriate
action. When the Federal inspection results from information provided
to the Secretary by any person, the Secretary shall notify such person
when the Federal inspection is proposed to be carried out and such person shall be allowed to accompany the inspector during the inspection.
- Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 8.
"= 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West Supp. 1979).
',
30 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West Supp. 1979).
30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(3) provides in relevant part:
When, on the basis of a Federal inspection which is carried out during the enforcement of a Federal program or a Federal lands program,
Federalinspection pursuant to section 502, or section 504(b) or during
Federal enforcement of a State program in accordance with subsection
(b) of this section, the Secretary or his authorized representative determines that any permittee is in violation of any requirement of this Act
or any permit condition required by this Act; but such violation does not
create an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, or cannot be reasonably expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water resources, the Secretary or authorized
representative shall issue a notice to the permittee or his agent fixing a
reasonable time but not more than ninety days for the abatement of the
violation and providing opportunity for public hearing.
If, upon expiration of the period of time as originally fixed or subsequently extended, for good cause shown and upon the written finding of
the Secretary or his authorized representative, the Secretary or his authorized representative finds that the violation has not been abated, he
shall immediately order a cessation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations or the portion thereof relevant to the violation ....
[emphasis added].
This section provides the basic enforcement mechanism for enforcement of the
SMCRA when the Secretary determines that a permittee is in violation. Section
502, referred to in the quoted language, governs the interim regulatory program.
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is directed to require immediate federal inspection when he has
reports from not less than two consecutive state inspections evidencing violations of the interim performance standards. Third,
the SMCRA provides for immediate federal inspection when the
Secretary has any information which gives rise to a reasonable
belief that the interim standards are being violated. In all three of
these instances the Secretary is directed to implement necessary
enforcement actions consistent with the enforcement provisions
of the SMCRA. The enforcement provisions referred to are the
notice of violation and cessation orders provisions under section
521,240 and the civil penalty provisions of section 518.241 The court
found a conflict between section 502(e)(2), and its requirement of
immediate federal inspection and enforcement, and section
521(a)(1), which requires notice to the state regulatory authority
so that it may take appropriate acton prior to federal action.
The court looked to the specific enforcement provision of section 521(a)(3) to settle the conflict. That section requires the Secretary to issue a notice of violation to a permittee when a federal
inspection, conducted during the interim program, uncovers a violation of the SMCRA.UI The court held that "[t]he imposition of
section 521(a)(1) notice requirement as a condition precedent to
federal enforcement of the interim regulatory program pursuant
to section 521(a)(3) is contrary to the unequivocal terms of section 521(a)(3). '' "s This holding was supported by the legislative

history of the SMCRA. "[T]here is no single provision in the Act
or excerpt from the legislative history which synthesizes and articulates with clarity the federal-state relationship intended by
Congress during the regulatory program. Indeed, the relevant
materials... are ambiguous." 2" However, after an examination
of the statutory language and legislative history, the court concluded that section 521(a)(1) notice is not a condition precedent
to federal inspection and enforcement during the interim phase.
Section 521(a)(1) only requires notice by the Secretary to the ap30 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West Supp. 1979).
U.S.C.A. § 1268 (West Supp. 1979).
'2' This notice must fix a reasonable time, not more than ninety days, for the
abatement of the violation. An opportunity for a public hearing must also be provided. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
2S Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 12.
24 Id. at n. 6.
$40

241 30
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proved state regulatory authority during the permanent program.
The court next focused its attention on the jurisdictional issue raised by defendants' motions to dismiss. 245 It noted that the
plaintiffs could have presented their complaints concerning the
proper interpretation of the notice requirements in section
521(a)(1) "during the Secretary's promulgation of the interim
rules and, again, in conjunction with the judicial review which followed. ' ' 24 1 "A party cannot circumvent the rulemaking review
process established by Congress by drafting the allegations soley
in terms of the Act in hope of litigating issues which in reality
reach not the validity of the statute, but go towards the validity
2 47
of the previously promulgated interim regulatory program.
The court held that was precisely what the plaintiffs had attempted to do, and therefore granted the defendahts' motions to
dismiss.
Whenever actions under the interim regulations give rise to
any new, initially unforeseeable perspectives on the significance
or scope of the regulations, thereby creating genuine questions as
to whether the regulations are consistent with the SMCRA, "ConId. at 12.
Id. at 21. Judicial review is provided for in SMCRA section 526; 30
U.S.C.A. § 1276 (West Supp. 1979). 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1) provides:
Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program or to prepare or promulgate a Federal program pursuant to this
Act shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District
Court for the District which includes the capital of the State whose program is at issue. Any action by the Secretary promulgating national
rules or regulationsincluding standardspursuant to sections 501, 515,
516, and 523 shall be subject to judicial review in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any other action
constituting rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject to judicial review only by the United States District Court for the District in which
the surface coal mining operation is located. Any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be affirmed unless the court concludes that such action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent
with law. A petition for review of any action subject to judicialreview
under this subsection shall be filed in the appropriate Court within
sixty days from the date of such action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day. Any such
petition may be made by any person who participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by the action of the Secretary.
[emphasis added].
'47 Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 21.
245
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gress has provided a mechanism for relief by an aggrieved
party.

'2 48

The proper forum in which to seek such relief is the

District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 9 Because of this provision, the court found itself lacking jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs'
claims.
2. "Permittees" Under the Interim Program
Each plaintiff maintained that it was not a "permittee" as
that term is used in the SMCRA, and therefore the Secretary's
issuance of cessation orders and notices of violation to underground mining operators was contrary to section 521(a)(3) requirements. 250 The plaintiffs reasoned that since section 521(a)(3)
limits the issuance of cessation orders to "permittees," and a
"permittee" is defined as a person holding a permit to conduct
mining and reclamation operations issued during the permanent
phase by the state regulatory authority or the Secretary,2' 5 ' section 521(a)(3) was rendered ineffective during the interim regula-

tory program. "The precise question ... is whether federal enforcement during the interim program is . . . confined to the

precise terms of Section 521. ' '252 The court held that Federal enforcement was not so limited, reasoning that the only consistent
construction of sections 502(e) and 521 subjects underground coal

248 Id. at 22. SMCRA section 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1) (West Supp.
1979), requires that petitions for judicial review be filed within sixty days from the
date the regulations are finally promulgated. Petitions may be received after sixty
days if based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day.
249 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1) (West. Supp. 1979).
210 Section 521(a)(3), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979), provides:
When, on the basis of a Federal inspection which is carried out during the enforcement of a Federal program or a Federal lands program,
Federal inspection pursuant to section 502, or section 504(b) or during
Federal enforcement of a State program in accordance with subsection
(b) of this section, the Secretary or his authorized representative determines that any permittee is in violation of any requirement of this Act
or any permit condition required by this Act; but such violation does not
create an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, or cannot be reasonably expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, or water resources, the Secretary or his authorized
representative shall issue a notice to the permittee or his agent fixing a
reasonable time but not more than ninety days for the abatement of the
violation and providing opportunity for public hearing.
"' See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291(15), (18) (West Supp. 1979).
2B Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 27.
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mining operations to federal inspection and enforcement during
the interim regulatory program. The court further held that the
statutory definition of "permittee" is not applicable during the
interim phase of the regulatory program.
The court noted that the surface impacts of underground
mining operations are subject to the interim regulatory program
"by the plain meaning of the Act's definitional sections."253 During the interim period, the Secretary is to fashion federal enforcement action directed at persons conducting mining and reclamation operations regulated by a state under state law, whether such
operations are conducted with or without a permit.25 ' The court

stated:
To read sections 502(e) and 521(a)(3) together and conclude that an operation may fall within the requirements of
the interim regulatory program, yet not be subject to federal
enforcement for violations of the interim requirements because
the operator is not holding a permit as defined by the Act or
otherwise would not only substantially limit the Secretary's
enforcement authority over operations -clearly within the ambit
of section 502, but would be contrary to the scope of the interim regulatory program. Any other reading of these two sections renders the interim regulatory program unenforceable
against a potentially significant number of surface coal mining
operations. Such a construction would frustrate Congress' concern over the competitive disadvantages which would result if
surface coal mining operations were held
to different regula25
tory standards between various states. 5
In concluding this issue, the court pointed to the duty when
faced with a motion to dismiss to examine the complaint to determine whether the allegations present a claim for relief on any
possible theory. The court deferred its ruling on the defendants'
motions to dismiss the claim concerning the Secretary's issuances
of notices to "non-permittees" because of the possibility of a constitutional challenge to the regulatory scheme of the interim program. Such a challenge could be "for failure to prescribe in
plainer terms that notices of violation and cessation orders may
be assessed during the interim phase against any surface coal

15

Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.

1

Id. at 29.

25
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mining operation rather than the statutorily defined 'permittee.' 126 Since this issue was not raised or argued by the parties,
the court expressed no opinion on its merits and allowed plain2 57
tiffs to amend their complaint so as to present such a challenge.
3. Equitable Estoppel
The plaintiffs based their assertion that OSM was equitably
estopped from enforcing the interim program in West Virginia
due to a letter from its Director to the Director of the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources and the language of section 101(f) " of the SMCRA. The complaints alleged that this letter, referred to as the "Heine-Callaghan" letter, recognized the
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources as the regulatory
authority in West Virginia and further approved West Virginia's
regulations as essentially in compliance with and adequate to implement the initial regulatory program. It was alleged that the
West Virginia Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee relied
on this letter when it approved the Department of Natural Resources' regulations.
The court dismissed this claim for two reasons. First, the
complaint lacked an allegation of detrimental reliance by the
plaintiffs, an essential element of equitable estoppel. Second, section 502(e) commands the Secretary to implement and enforce a
federal enforcement policy until the state program is approved or
a federal program is implemented. "The Act affords no basis
upon which the Secretary may delegate his responsibility of enforcing the interim regulatory program to a state. 25 The court
cited Montilla v. United States, 260 stating that no officer or agent
of the government may estop the government from enforcing a
I" Id. at 31.
" Plaintiffs

so amended their complaint. At publication, this issue was still

pending before the court.
25 SMCRA section 101(f), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(f) (West Supp. 1979), provides

that:
[B]ecause of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and
other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing,
and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations

subject to this Act should rest with the States.
"' Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 34.

2- 457 F.2d 478 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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law unless such official is authorized to do so and is acting within
the scope of his authority, as in cases involving contractual dealings with the government. Since OSM does not have the authority
to delegate the duty to enforce the interim regulatory program to
a state, the court held that the federal government could not be
estopped by the "Heine-Callaghan" letter from enforcing the in-.
terim phase of SMCRA in West Virginia.
4. "Regulation" by a State
The last issue resolved by the court concerned paragraph X
of the plaintiffs' complaints, which asserted that "West Virginia
underground mining operations are not subject to the interim regulatory program because they were not operations 'on lands on
which such operations are regulated by a state' at the time of enactment of the Act, section 502(e)."2 "1 The parties admitted this
question to be a "purely legal one," relieving the plaintiffs of any
requirements to exhaust their administrative remedies.
Second 502(c) provides that "all surface coal mining operations on lands on which such operations are regulated by the state
shall comply with"262 the interim regulatory program, on or after
nine months from the date of enactment of the Act on August 3,
1977, or subsequent thereto.2 63 The court held that any attempt
to limit section 502(c) to state regulation in effect on August 3,
1977, was unsupportable, due to a lack of congressional restrictions, the plain meaning of section 502(c) and the legislative
history.
The United States Supreme Court stated, in Udall v. Tallman,264 that "[w]hen faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given
by the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration." 2' 5 Such interpretation need not be the only reasonable
one or the one the Supreme Court would have reached had the
issue been first raised in judicial proceedings; it need only be rea281Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 3.
262 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(c) (West Supp. 1979).
26

See 30 C.F.R. §§ 710.3(a), 710.11(a), 715.11(a) (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 62,642

(1977).
(7 380 U.S. 1
(1965).
2'5Id. at 16.
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sonable in itself.2' The court, in the present case, found no legislative history to support the contention that the Secretary's reading of section 502(c) referring to state regulation in effect on
August 3, 1977, and subsequent thereto, was unreasonable. Therefore, the court held that West Virginia legislation2 67 which explicitly addressed the surface impacts of underground mining, effective March 11, 1978, was sufficient to bring West Virginia
underground mining operations within the ambit of section
502(c).
Conclusion
The regulation of coal mining activities is traditionally associated with state authorities. Since the state is expected to have
primary regulatory responsibility for administration of the permanent phase of the SMCRA once the federal government approves the state program, the court in the present case reasoned
it would "not seem illogical that a state ... with the experience

and expertise of West Virginia (in regulating coal mine opera2 68
tions) be afforded a similar role during the interim phase.
However, the court's analysis of the SMCRA, and its "considerable apparent inconsistencies," '2 6 ' showed that while both state and

federal authorities have prescribed duties during the interim
phase, Congress chose to vest the principle interim-enforcement
responsibility in the Secretary of Interior.
The major role during the interim phase of regulation under
the SMCRA is to be fulfilled by the federal government. This
construction seems most consistent with Congress' design to insure that differing state regulatory standards for surface coal
mine operations and reclamation do not result in competitive disadvantages in interstate commerce, and that the several states are
able to "improve and maintain adequate standards on coal min2"

Id.

167Act

of March 11, 1978, ch. 63, 1978 W. Va. Acts 387. This act amended W.
Va. Code article 6, chapter 20, by expanding the rulemaking authority of the Director of Natural Resources and the Reclamation Commission to include the
power to regulate and enforce rules regulating the surface impacts of deep mining

in West Virginia in conformity with SMCRA.
2" Union Carbide v. Andrus, supra note 232, at 4.
269 Id.
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ing operations within their borders. ' '270

Allen R. Prunty
VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING & RECLAMATION AsSOCIATION, INC. V.

ANDRUS

Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. v.
Andrus 7 1 addressed several challenges to the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.272 The case, initiated by a
voluntary association of coal operators, a group of sixty three
members, four coal landowners, the Town of Wise, Virginia, and
the Commonwealth of Virginia, asserted that SMCRA was in controversion of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,2 73 constituted a violation of the states' powers under the
tenth amendment, constituted a taking in violation of the fifth
amendment, denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the law, and
denied procedural due process in allowing pre-hearing cessation
orders. The challenge was directed at the SMCRA under the initial regulatory program, and a preliminary injunction was issued
February 14, 1979.274 The Fourth Circuit reversed the injunction

pending a hearing on the request for permanent relief.

75

The challenge focused on Subchapter V of the Act, the crucial control of environmental impact sections. The court made
three preliminary findings. It first found that plaintiffs were properly before the court and that the claims against the initial program were ripe for adjudication.2 76 Second, in the most understated portion of the opinion, the court found the SMCRA to be a
valid exercise of the commerce clause power by Congress. 277 Fi-0 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(g) (West Supp. 1979).
7, No. 78-0224-B (W.D. Va. Jan. 3, 1980) (hereinafter cited as Virginia Sur-

face Mining).
172 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, P.L. 95-87, 91 Stat.
445, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1979) (hereinafter cited as SMCRA).
2" U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8.
174 Virginia Surface Mining, No. 78-0244-B (W. D. Va. Feb. 14, 1979) (preliminary injunction). See Comment, 81 W. VA. L. Rav. 799 (1979). This comment is in

part a development of that discussion.
275 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-79 (West Supp. 1979).
27' Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 271, at 4.
277 Id. at 4-6. The commerce clause challenge was based on the reasoning that
SMCRA in regulating private, non-federal lands in land use planning exceeded
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nally, it dismissed the equal protection challenge.
The Tenth Amendment
In part HI of the opinion, the court considered challenges
based on the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution2 7 8 to sec-

tion 515(d) and (e)37 9 of SMCRA. The court examined National
the congressional power. This challenge is buttressed by the congressional finding
that primary regulatory responsibility should be in the states. 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1201(f) (West Supp. 1979). The argument continues that the mining of coal is
an intrastate problem; the sale and transportation of coal effects interstate commerce. Cf. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where the court held
that a restriction on making bricks was not a restriction on mining clay; these
activities were separate under the fifth amendment's taking clause. But see Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, P.L. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, 30 U.S.C.A. §
801 et seq. (West Supp. 1979).
Congress' answer to this contention is "surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce
among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine
the ability of the several states to improve and maintain adequate standards on
coal mining operations within their borders. . ." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(g).
The Virginia Surface Mining court found commerce clause power for
SMCRA because Congress had a rational basis for finding a regulatory scheme
necessary to protect commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
The nature of the controversy is heightened by the provisions of SMCRA requiring the states to promulgate regulatory programs similar to those of SMCRA.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1253. The penalties for not submitting an approved plan is that a
federal plan will be imposed, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1254, and that no money will be available under the abandoned mine reclamation program, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1235(c), and
for assistance in setting up a regulatory program. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1295. If the state
does not "enforce" the approved program, OSM retains power to enforce it. 30
U.S.C.A. § 1254(b). If SMCRA was enacted in violation of the commerce clause,
the effect of a state being "encouraged" to enact a mirror image of the federal
program would be to wash out constitutional infirmity upon adoption, The regulations, except for federal monitoring, would be state actions.
On this issue, Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 100 S. Ct. 383 (1980) should be noted.
The Court there stated that although Congress had not done so, "in light of its
expansive authority under the Commerce Clause, there is no question but that
Congress could assure the public a right of access to the [privately owned marina
joined to a navigable bay] if it so chose." Id. at 390. (emphasis added). The Court
had just upheld the right of the landowners to exclude the public under a taking
argument. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Further
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this comment.
171 U.S. CoNsT. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
9'30 U.S.C.A. § 1265(d), (e) (West Supp. 1979).
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League of Cities v. Usery2 s0 and concluded it controlled the tenth
amendment claim of infringement. It was, in fact, the source of
the court's test: "Applying the holding of National League of Cities, congressional action alleged to be in contravention of the
tenth amendment must be scrutinized to determine whether the
legislation is directed to the states as states and usurps an 'integral governmental function.'

"281

The court questioned whether the SMCRA was directed at
the states or at coal operators. It found the "pervasive effect" of
SMCRA to be on state legislative authority and on state control
of land within its boundaries.28 2 Section 515, the court reasoned,
interfered with essential decisions of state and local governments;
the requirement that steep slope contour mining be returned to
the approximate original contours deprived the state of control
over economic development in land use planning.288 It considered
the magnitude of economic disruption caused by the stringent requirements of the SMCRA and engaged in a balancing of interests.2 84 The court found that no harm would result to the federal
government or to the environment in enjoining section 515 but,
conversely, the economy of western Virginia would be drastically

"0 426 U.S. 833. In this case, the Court held that the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (West 1978)
(FLSA), were inapplicable to state and local government employees, as well as
inapplicable to employees of state maintained hospitals and schools, overruling
Md. v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
The majority opinion phrased the inquiry as whether the provision of FLSA
affected "functions essential to separate and independent existence." 426 U.S. at
845. Analysis rested heavily on the notion that essential state-supplied services by
employees were being curtailed. See Michelman, States' Rights and States Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1172 (1977); Note, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local
Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 665 (1977). It found that the state's separate and independent existence was
threatened by FLSA, which would cause in its application fundamental changes in
employment decisions by causing drastic budgetary reallocation.
"I Virginia Surface Mining at 8.
82 Id.
"

Id. at 10-11.

No balancing was acknowledged in National League of Cities. Justice
Blackmun in his concurring opinion suggested the majority had done just that.
See text at note 296, infra. The Virginia Surface Mining court stated that balancing was the appropriate test. Virginia Surface Mining at 13.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss4/50

54

Winfrey et al.: Special Student Project: Developments under the Surface Mining Co
1331
SPECIAL STUDENT PROJECT
1980]
affected by its enforcement.2 85
The court's analysis of the effect of the SMCRA on the states
"as states," illustrates the problem with that analysis in National
League of Cities. NationalLeague of Cities concerned the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage to state
and local governmental employees. Application of the federal act
directly affected the local governments in their role as employers,
in effect telling them what to pay. Even so, some question exists
whether the court correctly reasoned that act applied to the state
as a state rather than as an employer in the labor market.2 6 In
Virginia Surface Mining, the court concluded that section 515 affected the states as states, passing over the end result of the
SMCRA, which is, of course, the regulation of mining practices
which the operator, not the state of Virginia, performs. 2 s 7 To assert that the SMCRA affects the states and usurps part of the
states' regulatory function is correct; many acts of Congress affect
state regulatory decisions.2ss But to assert that it affects the state
as a state, dictating what practices a state may perform or how it
may perform them, does not directly follow.
Further uncertainty exists as to whether SMCRA affects the
state's ability to regulate intergovernmental functions. In this
context, the court, in its opinion in National League of Cities,
discussed the costs of implementing the Fair Labor Standards
Act in California.2 " The Virginia Surface Mining court made a
similar comparison of the indirect effects of the SMCRA on the
economy of western Virginia, both from a taxing and a private
economic standpoint. The court, however, failed to mention the
federal interest in the balance. It merely noted that the require-

2"

Id.

426 U.S. at 871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Can the States engage in
business competing with the private sector and then come to the courts arguing
that withdrawing those employees of those businesses from the private sector
evades the powers of the Federal Government to regulate commerce?" Id. at 872.
267 See SMCRA § 101, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 1979).
28 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), where the Court
upheld federal regulations in meat processing and flour milling and required California regulations to yield to effectuate the purposes and objectives of Congress.
2'8 The Court discussed significant economic impact of FLSA on California
governments, 426 U.S. at 846-48; however, it reasoned that "particularized assessments of actual impact" was not crucial to resolution of this issue. 426 U.S. at 851.
Justice Blackmun thought otherwise. See note 296, infra.
"
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ments of section 515 are "not environmentally sound and [do] not
serve the conservation interests of the federal government."' 9 0
The court's balancing seems to be not on questions of constitutionality as much as on policy.2 91 Compliance with the SMCRA
does not create the same situation as in National League of Cities where the state was told directly how to function in its role as
an employer. The only similarity in the two cases is the eventual
loss of revenue suffered by the governments - in the National
League of Cities situation from direct interference, and in the
SMCRA situation from loss of coal tax revenues. Whether this
similarity is enough for the tenth amendment is doubtful.
The problem created by National League of Cities and illustrated in Virginia Surface Mining is from a new, substantive
reading of the tenth amendment, heretofore viewed as having no
content. Traditionally it was but "a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered." 29 2 Under this view, if Congress
had commerce clause power to regulate surface mining,29 3 the
states had surrendered the power to Congress by the Constitution. National League of Cities found content in the tenth
amendment for the first time.2 " The problem in Virginia Surface
Mining is how to read the holding of National League of Cities.
If narrowly construed, the effect of direct intervention into state
employer decisions is different than the SMCRA's effect on the
states. If read broadly, however, the holding would not only strike
the SMCRA, but would subject virtually all environmental legis'" Virginia Surface Mining at 13. Several questions are raised by these find-

ings. On the state's side of the balance, the court found "this provision and the
post-mining land use restrictions drastically affect the economy of the Commonwealth of Virginia, making it economically and physically impossible to mine coal,
and prevents the state from using its land for agricultural purposes, for construction of airports, schools, hospitals, and for other activities." Id. Query whether
land affected by section 515, slopes of at least twenty degrees, would ever be able
to be used for schools, airports and hospitals. This in most cases sounds like a
complaint about regulation of mountaintop removal, § 515(c)(2), 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1265(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979), not at issue in this case.
"1 426 U.S. at 874 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
293 Virginia Surface Mining at 4-6.
I" See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857-76 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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lation to demise under the "reserved powers of the states."29 5 A
formidable obstacle lies in the path of this broad interpretation.
In National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun, concurring,
stated: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to
me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 96
This statement, coupled with the 5-4 vote in the case, indicates
that in the case of environmental legislation, the Court would
support the federal power. In this respect, subchapter V of the
SMCRA appears to retain its vitality under the tenth
amendment.
The Taking Issue
In part V of the opinion the court examined the claim that
the requirements of section 51529 requiring return to approximate original contours of steep slope contour mining constituted
a taking of property without just compensation under the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 522,298
dealing with the designation of lands unsuitable for mining, was
also challenged on similar grounds. These challenges were the basis upon which the earlier preliminary injunction was issued.2 99
The court's primary focus was on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,3 00 where government action in prohibiting mining which
would cause subsidence under dwelling places was found to be a
taking of mineral rights. The proposed mining was from mineral
rights reserved when the surface was conveyed for dwelling places
to be built. The Court said that to stop the mining required con-

2'

Cf. D.C. v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub. noma.
EPA v.

Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), where quality control standards of a federal program

were found to be in contravention of the tenth amendment where requiring enforcement with non-consenting states, with SMCRA, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (West

Supp. 1979).

2" 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Virginia Surface Mining

court did not agree. Virginia Surface Mining at 8, n.5.
1- 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265 (West Supp. 1979).
213 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272 (West Supp. 1979).
2"Virginia Surface Mining, No. 78-0244-B (W.D. Va. Feb. 14, 1979).
3- 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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demnation: "For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in
the right to mine it. . ." To make it commercially impracticable
to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.80 1 The diminution of value of the coal rights was viewed by the court as very
significant in the taking question.
In Virginia Surface Mining, the findings of the court were
that the approximate original contour requirement of section 515
and the unsuitable for mining designations of section 522 worked
to effectively eliminate the possibility of mining the affected
coal.302 The court considered the three-part test of Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead.03s whether the regulation is reasonable in
light of the measure it is to control, the availability of less drastic
controls and the loss which the owner suffers. The court concluded that in most cases, the requirement of section 515 could
not be economically met or even met at all. Citing the reliance of
the economy of the region on coal mining, the court found the
effect of the regulations too drastic for acceptance in light of the
countervailing policy of environmental protection.
Next the court focused on Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. City of New York. 3 4 In that case, New York City had declared
Grand Central Station a landmark under protection of a
landmark preservation act and subsequently denied Penn Central's request to build an office building onto the top of the station. The Court recognized that the restriction worked an uneven
burden on the owner but nonetheless found on the facts of the
case that the regulation was reasonable. Although the best use of
the property was taken, the owners still enjoyed economic benefit
from the station as it existed, as well as development rights transferable to other buildings as a result of the preservation act. Additionally, the entire public benefitted from the preservation of
landmarks.
The Virginia Surface Mining court found two distinctions in
Penn Central.One, a "reasonable return" was available on Grand
Id. at 414.
Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 299, at 12.
303 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The fact that the regulation deprives the property of
its most beneficial use does not make it unconstitutional. Id. at 592.
3- 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
301
301
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Central Station even subjected to the restrictions, while no such
return was available on coal rendered unmineable by sections 515
and 522. Second, while the present use of the station was not affected in Penn Central,the court concluded that present mining
and plans for mining would be preempted by the SMCRA regulations.3 0 5 Thus, the court found the case distinguishable on its
facts.
Two recent cases were considered: Andrus v. Allard,30 dealing with the regulation of ownership of certain bird parts, and
07
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,3
dealing with the use of a marina attached to a public harbor. In Allard, the Court found no
taking in the regulation of ownership of the bird parts acquired
before the inception of the act. It concluded that although the
owner of the artifacts could not sell them, he did not lose total
economic benefit of ownership. He could still transport them,
show them in an exhibit or donate them. A lessening of value
alone was not enough to constitute a taking. No actual physical
restraint was placed on the artifacts. The Court thereby distinguished Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon as constituting both a
loss of economic benefit and a physical restraint against coal removal.308 Kaiser Aetna dealt with what the Court termed a fundamental property right-the right to exclude others.3 0 9 The
30 Except for the grandfather provision of 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(6) (West
Supp. 1979).
100 S. Ct. 318 (1979). This case dealt with regulations promulgated under
the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
16 U.S.C. § 703. The regulations prohibited all but possession and transportation
of parts of birds within the acts' coverage killed before the acts became effective.
The regulations were challenged as a taking. The Court rejected the challenge and
found the regulations reasonable.
'7 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979). A private lagoon in Hawaii was dredged and, with
permission of the Corps of Engineers, joined with a navigable bay. The government sought to open the newly-created marina to the public. The Court said to
open the marina to the public would require eminent domain proceedings.
30 Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. at 327, n.22. But cf. Hadacheck v. City of Los
Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
I It is instead a case in which the owner of what once was a private
pond, separated from concededly navigable water by a barrier beach and
used for aquatic agriculture, has invested substantial amounts of money
in making improvements. The government contends that as a result of
one of these improvements, the pond's connection to the navigable
water in a manner approved by the Corps of Engineers, the owner has
somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
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Court suggested another three-part test for taking cases, focusing
upon the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
the government action. It found that in the balance of the three,
if the public was to be allowed entrance to the marina, the government would have to pay for that right.
The Virginia Surface Mining court found both these cases in
harmony with its finding of a taking. As Allard suggested, there
was the loss of an economic benefit, as well as physical restrictions placed upon the coal. As Kaiser Aetna indicated, the interference with reasonable investment-backed decisions was absolute.
These findings indicate the trouble with precedent in the
takings cases. As Allard teaches, "[r]esolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for
the application of logic.

3 10

Several distinctions can be made here.

Foremost is the difference between mineral estate owners and fee
estate owners. For mineral estate owners, Pennsylvania Coal Co.
is very closely on point. If the coal cannot economically be mined,
they own nothing. It is difficult to envision what would ever be a
taking under the Constitution if this is not one. With regard to
fee estate owners, however, although their rights to mine the coal
have been restricted, they nonetheless retain some benefit from
surface use, even on steep slopes.s Allard in this view could be
read as supporting the SMCRA because the fee owners still enjoy
some benefits. Kaiser Aetna could also be supportive because the
"right to exclude" is not involved, and the government has
preconditioned mining on compliance. But Kaiser Aetna's consideration of "reasonable investment backed expectations" cannot
be ignored, and the fact that the rights to the coal were acquired
to develop them into a profitable venture must be considered.
The parallel of Penn Central cannot be ignored. That opinthat are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude
others. Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 100 S. Ct. at 391.
0 Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. at 327.
311Cf. Andrus v. Allard, where the Court discussed that the use of the artifacts was perhaps limited, but not completely destroyed. They could still be displayed or donated. Displaying the bird parts was obviously not what the owners
had in mind, and'the donative value is highly suspect. Nevertheless, the Court did
base its decision partly on these facts.
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ion contains a lengthy discussion and finding of dominating public purpose in landmark designation and preservation, even in the
face of restrictions on ownership. The Court acknowledged the
heavy burden placed on the landowners, but reasoned that the
overriding public benefit justified the restrictions. The SMCRA
has been the subject of lengthy public debate and ultimately
legislative finding of such a public purpose."'s
Balancing of the interests is the consideration in the taking
cases. The best function they serve as precedent are to factual
discussions and distinctions. It is difficult to reconcile Penn Central with Kaiser Aetna; the only distinction seemingly existent is
the public purpose override in Penn Central, although there the
"right to exclude" was not involved. Sections 515 and 522 of the
SMCRA serve valid public purposes-preservation of the environment and protection of the citizenry. But whether these goals
rise above the inescapable fact that the owner of the mineral
rights on these designated lands has essentially nothing left after
their application is a hard question. The hard answer is perhaps
that public purpose does not control. Distinctions such as that
between mineral and fee owners are only superficial answers.
Rights in different estates in land are not like rights in selling and
owning bird parts; the fact that the estates can be severed and
developed separately indicates not separate sticks in the bundle,
but rather, it indicates separate bundles. Perhaps the direct protection of the health and safety of the public envisioned in section
522 can save it from a taking provision; section 515 does not enjoy
such a distinction.
ProceduralDue Process
In part VI of the opinion the Court considered challenges to
sections 518, 521 and 525,313 which are the enforcement provisions
dealing with penalty assessments, cessation orders and subsequent hearings. At issue first was whether the authority of a field
inspector to issue an immediate cessation order violated procedural due process rights of the operator under the fifth amend30 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 1979); see UdaU, The Enactment of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1979 in Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L.
REv. 553 (1979).
313 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1268, 1271(a), 1275 (West Supp. 1979).
312
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ment.3 1 4 A similar challenge to section 521 was made in In Re
3 15
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.
In deciding the motion
for summary judgment by the industry plaintiffs, the court considered whether the initial program's application of section 521(a)
violated due process. The court found that in providing for immediate relief following the order's issuance, SMCRA provided adequate protection. s i s

314 If an inspector on any federally authorized inspection determines that a
condition or practice exists that is in violation of any requirement of SMCRA
which causes either an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public or
can reasonably be expected to cause significant imminent environmental harm to
land, air, or water resources, he may immediately issue a cessation order. 30
U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(2); 30 C.F.R. § 722.11 (1979). "Imminent danger to the health
and safety of the public" is defined as a practice that can reasonably be expected
to cause harm to the public outside the permit area. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(8). No
definition of "significant imminent environmental harm" is given in SMCRA; a
broad definition is in the regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 (1979) in effect makes the
definition hinge on "an appreciable adverse impact not immediately reparable."
Once the order issues, section 525(a), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1275(a), gives the operator
thirty days to appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary has then
thirty days to conduct a hearing and render a decision, section 525(b), 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1275(b). In the interim, section 525(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1275(c), allows for temporary relief by the Secretary if 1) a hearing has been held locally where all concerned have had opportunity to be heard; 2) the applicant shows substantial likelihood he will prevail; and 3) such relief will not adversely affect the health or
safety of the public or cause significant, imminent environmental harm (ironically,
the same test which warranted the issuance of the order, section 521(d)(2)).
Judicial review of an adverse decision by the Secretary is then available.
An informal review is also mandated by section 521(a)(5), 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1271(a)(5), which requires a hearing at the minesite within thirty days of the
order, with expiration of the order if the hearing is not held. OSM must render a
decision based on this hearing within fifteen days. 30 C.F.R. § 722.15 (1979).
315 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1319-23 (D.D.C. 1978). See Case Comment, 81 W. VA.
L. REv. 785 (1979).
311 In Virginia Surface Mining, tl~e government made a plea of res judicata as
to the plaintiffs Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association and Commonwealth of Virginia as parties to the earlier decision in In Re Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation. The court dismissed the plea, stating that the earlier challenge went to the issue of control of governmental action under the section, not
whether due process violations had occurred. Virginia Surface Mining, supra note
299, at 29. The court also distinguished cases cited in In Re Surface Mining Regu.
lation Litigation as not going as far toward a deprivation of private interests as
had been demonstrated in this case under SMCRA. Since at least some of the
parties, the town of Wise, Virginia, and the landowner, were not parties to In Re
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, the plea would not work a total' bar to adjudication. Collateral estoppel might still be an issue in this case.
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The Virginia Surface Mining court, however, disagreed with
this decision. It found, based on the evidence presented, that orders had been issued under section 521(a) in a pattern of arbitrariness causing irreparable harm to the mining companies. The
court attributed this to the language of the regulations which
gave the inspector broad discretion in deciding what constituted
"significant imminent environmental harm. 3 17 The due process
test used to determine the propriety of a pre-hearing order was
that laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge,318 and consisted of three
elements: 1) the private interests affected; 2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interests and the probable value of additional
or substitute safeguards; and 3) the government's interest, including the burden of additional or substitute requirements. The
court found, based on the evidence, that significant economic
harm, many times irreparable, resulted from abuse of the procedure. It suggested a substitute procedure wherein OSM would apply directly to a district court for an order. The government's interest was never discussed, although the court concluded that the
proceeding before a district judge would be a "relatively insubstantial burden"3 19 to the government.
The three incidences of improper orders appeared to be the
weightiest consideration of the decision. In all three cases the order to cease was later rescinded. By the time they were lifted,
however, in one case the operator had gone bankrupt, in the second the operator incurred a substantial loss of coal in the ground
due to the weather, and in the third an operation consisting of
five hundred workers was down for two days. While these instances demonstrate that the cessation system can be improperly
operated, they do not show that it is the system's fault which
causes the loss. In fact, in two of the cases the post-order hearing
caught the mistakes and corrected them exactly as it was
designed to do. The finding of unconstitutionality in these cases
seems to say that the system is improper because it did not see
the subsequent loss. This argument fails. No pre-adjudication ces-

317 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 (1979). At least one author has viewed the problem as a
statute narrowly drawn but a regulation drawn overly broad. Hemenway, Selected
Issues Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 24
ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 233, 248-51 (1975).
318 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
319 Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 299, at 36.
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sation or seizure would ever be allowable under this reasoning.
Also, it must be remembered that procedural due process rules
are shaped by the general
risk inherent in the truthfinding pro0
cess, not on exceptions.32

The biggest problem with the cessation order provision is the
definition of "significant imminent environmental harm" in the
regulations. There, under the definition of "significant"-"the
harm is appreciable and not immediately reparable1 821 - the discretion of the inspectors to issue cessation
orders seems overly
32 2
broad for fifth amendment safeguards.
Section 518 is clearly not a proper exercise of the police
power. In order to challenge the Secretary's finding of fault and
assessment of a penalty, that penalty must first be paid to the
Secretary, subject to refund. The pre-hearing payment in order to
get a hearing offends due process constraints.2
As sections 518, 521 and 525 are written, it appears that adequate due process is guaranteed. Only the regulatory definition of
section 521 seems to offend the operators' general right to due
process in dealing with violations.
Conclusion
The injunction issued by the court in Virginia Surface Mining has been stayed by Chief Justice Burger pending appeal of
the decision.'" It is presumed that the government will exercise
its right of appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. There are at least two other challenges to
the SMCRA similar to this case, Star Coal Co. v. Andrus 25 and
State of Indiana v. Andrus,3 " which the court could consider in

consolidation for a complete review of Subchapter V.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344.
-1 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 (iii) (1979).
3 But see In Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301,
1321, n.22 (D.D.C. 1978).
3" Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
3" Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 48
U.S.L.W. 3601 (March 18, 1980).
= No. 79-171-2 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 1980) (Motion for Preliminary
Injunction).
36 No. IP 78-500C (S.D. Ind. 1979) (pleadings stages).
32
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The tenth amendment challenge to the SMCRA appears
from the decisions to be insufficient. Likewise, the procedural due
process complaint of the plaintiffs is directed not at the SMCRA,
but at overeager inspectors. The problem that the Court must
squarely face is the taking challenge. If the fifth amendment taking provision retains any meaning at all, the Court will have substantial trouble not finding a taking.
STAR CoAL Co. v. ANDRUS

An interesting comparison to Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association v. AndrusM7 is the case of Star Coal Co.
v. Andrus,3 28 in which the same basic constitutional challenges to
the SMCRA were argued. The Federal district court for the
Southern District of Iowa considered the propriety of a preliminary injunction to the enforcement of the SMCRA in Iowa on the
grounds that the SMCRA was enacted in violation of the commerce clause and does not have a rational basis; that it contravenes the tenth amendment; that it constitutes a taking without
just compensation; that it violates the equal protection, substantive due process and procedural due process guarantees of the
fifth amendment; and that the imposition of a reclamation fee
constitutes a bill of attainder.
The court first looked at the history and purpose of the
SMCRA and noted the various stages of the initial regulatory
program now in effect and the permanent programs to follow.3'
In considering its jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction,
the court determined that Star Coal's challenge to the SMCRA
went directly to the constitutionality of the Act and that exhaustion of the full range of administrative remedies available was not
required since neither administrative law judges nor review
boards have the power to decide consitutional issues.83 0 The court
also found, as did the court in Virginia Surface Mining, that the
3'" No. 78-0224-B (W.D. Va. Jan. 3, 1980) (hereinafter cited as Virginia Surface Mining).
3 No. IP 78-500C (S.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 1980) (hereinafter cited as Star Coal).
The discussion of this case is a continuation of the discussion of Virginia Surface
Mining, supra. Therefore, the two should be read together.
S1, Star Coal, supra note 328, at 2-6.
330 Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 327, at 4; see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
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constitutional issues were ripe.331
The next matter addressed by the court was the proper standard for issuing a preliminary injunction under the SMCRA. Section 526(c) of the SMCRA specifically requires that, before an injunction can be issued, there must be notice and an opportunity
to be heard, a showing of a substantial likelihood by the moving
party that he or she will prevail, and a finding that public health
and safety, as well as the environment will not be harmed.8 2 A
more traditional test of substantial likelihood of success and a
possibility of irreparable injury has also been applied. 8 8 The
court noted Virginia Surface Mining and tentatively agreed that
its interpretation of section 526(c) standards should be controlling.838 It determined that all parties had notice and opportunity
to be heard and proceeded to examine the probable success on
the merits of the individual claims.
As to the commerce clause challenge, the court found that
Congress had commerce clause power to regulate surface mining
and that the SMCRA was rationally based. 8 5 Thus, both Star
Coal and Virginia Surface Mining support the commerce clause
basis of the act.
The court did not agree with Virginia Surface Mining, however, on the tenth amendment challenge, and found National
League of Cities v. Usery8 distinguishable. It concluded that the
SMCRA did not affect the "states as states," but rather affected
private operations. Once the statute was found to be within the
commerce clause, the fact that it preempts police power previ-

331

Star Coal, supra note 328, at 7.

m"SMCRA section 526(c), 30 U.S.C-.

§ 1276(c) (West Supp. 1979). The
standards for enjoining any order or decision of the Secretary are 1) all parties
have been given notice and opportunity to be heard; 2) the person requesting such
relief shows that there is substantial likelihood he will prevail on the merits; and
3) such relief will not adversely affect the public health or safety or cause significant environmental harm.
m This is a more traditional test consisting mainly of two elements: 1) substantial probability of success on the merits; and 2) the possibility of irreparable
injury if the relief is denied. Star Coal, supra note 328, at 8.
"4 Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. v. Andrus, 604 F.2d 312
(4th Cir. 1979), vacating No. 78-0224-B (W. D. Va. Feb. 14, 1979).
Star Coal, supra note 328, at 9-11.
-. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ously held by the state is irrelevant.""7
Likewise, the taking challenges under subchapter V and the
reclamation fee section 402"" were rejected. The court placed
heavy emphasis on balancing the public policy interests served by
requiring reclamation and the payment of a fee on coal being
presently mined so that abandoned mine reclamation projects can
be financed. The court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon339 on this ground. Additionally, the court concluded that
the congressional finding that surface mining and reclamation
technology are now developed which can work in compliance "as
far as practicable" with the SMCRA,"O rendered the taking question minimal. As a third factor, the court viewed this action of the
SMCRA not as a physical invasion by government but rather as
an interference "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good." 3' 1
Star Coal challenged the congressional finding of section
101(e) in relation to the prime farmland requirements of section
510(d)(1),34 mandating a topsoil reconstruction, which Star Coal
claimed through the introduction of evidence, could not be accomplished twenty years after mining. The court answered this
tender by stating that perhaps the regulations require a broad interpretation; nevertheless, the congressional finding of section
101(e) controlled to indicate no taking.
The court's reliance on the section 101(e) finding to the rejection of evidentiary findings may be too rigid. Great weight to congressional findings is certainly warranted given the lengthy congressional processes.3 s But to disregard solid engineering studies
in rigid deference may be too deferential, especially in light of the
fact that Congress in enacting SMCRA wrote largely without the

37Star Coal, supra note 328, at 12.
3" 30 U.S.C.A. § 1242 (West Supp. 1979).
-1 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
340 SMCRA section 101(e), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(e) (West Supp. 1979).
41 Star Coal, supra note 328, at 14, citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
342 30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979); cf. § 525, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265
(approximate original contour for steep slopes); § 510(b), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(b)
(alluvial valley floors).
34 See, e.g., Note, 81 W. VA. L. Rxv. 775 (1978), for a summary of SMCRA
legislative history.
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benefit of stringent standards of reclamation being used at
minesites, while presumably the Star Coal court was benefitted
by such a reclamation experience.
Substantive due process and equal protection claims based
on the fifth amendment were also rejected. The court found that
Congress had a rational basis for discriminating between surface
mining and underground mining9 in that findings indicate that
surface mining has more adverse environmental effects than does
underground mining."5
Finally, the court examined the procedural due process challenges to pre-hearing cessation orders of section 52146 and prehearing payment of penalties under section 518.' It noted the
result of similar challenges in In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litigations and Virginia Surface Mining, and decided that Virginia Surface Mining was distinguishable as indicating abuses
under section 521 as applied, but not as written.4 9 It reasoned
that adequate safeguards were available in post-order hearings to
protect aggrieved parties and agreed with the decision of In Re
Surface Mining that the section was constitutional. The court
did, however, make the same finding as that in Virginia Surface
Mining that the conditions of section 518 providing for prepayment of civil penalties in order to obtain a hearing violated procedural due process.8 50
The court issued preliminary injunctions only as to one specific notice of violation and to the enforcement of section 518 prepayment of penalties. It found no substantial likelihood of success
on the merits of any of the other constitutional challenges. Although this decision was only for a preliminary injunction, and
thus the precedential value is not on a plane of stare decisis, it
should not go unnoticed. It would be much more likely for the
court to grant an injunction and later reverse itself than to deny

M4

See, e.g., section 402(a), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1232(a) (West Supp. 1979) imposes

a reclamation fee of $.35 per ton on surface mined coal and $.15 per ton on underground mined coal.
" Star Coal, supra note 328, at 15-17.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West Supp. 1979).
30 U.S.C.A. § 1268 (West Supp. 1979).
318 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978).
-1 Star Coal, supra note 328, at 17.
34
'

350 Id. at 18-19.
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an injunction and later grant one in light of the court's reliance
on the substantial likelihood aspect of the section 526(c) test. The
appeal of Virginia Surface Mining, however, may render all but
the prime farmland taking issue moot.
William Sunday Winfrey, II
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